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ABSTRACT
Although management scholars have examined various antecedents of punishment in the
workplace, there has been scant research on how perceptions of the organizational context
influence decision-making regarding punishment. Building on the work of Cameron and
colleagues (Cameron, Bright, & Caza, 2004; Cameron & Caza, 2002), I propose that one’s
perceived organizational forgiveness – the perception of the extent to which the workplace is
forgiving – is negatively related with one’s punitive intent in response to ethical misconduct. In
addition, I identify variables involving the disciplinary agent and the ethical misconduct itself as
moderators of this relationship. In a lab study and a field study, I tested the main effect of
perceived organizational forgiveness and the moderating effects of these other variables on
punitive intent. Data from the lab study provided evidence of the hypothesized main effect and
suggested that the effect holds when the disciplinary agent is high in accountability and when the
misconduct has resulted in serious damage to the organization. Data from the field study
suggested that the negative relationship between perceived organizational forgiveness and
punitive intent seemed to hold only when an experience of being forgiven is salient in the mind
of the disciplinary agent and there are mitigating circumstances surrounding the ethical
misconduct that is the subject of punishment. Surprisingly, the field study results suggested a
positive relationship between perceived organizational forgiveness and punitive intent when an
experience of being denied forgiveness is salient to the disciplinary agent. The limitations of
these studies and potential implications of the findings are then discussed.
KEYWORDS: Perceived organizational forgiveness, punitive intent, ethical decision-making
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Punishment is an integral part of organized social life (Bandura, 1969; Carlsmith, 2006;
Spitzer, 1975). Not surprisingly, the use of punishment, or at least the threat of punishment, has
always been present in organizational settings (Arvey & Ivancevich, 1980; Atwater, Waldman,
Carey, & Cartier, 2001). At some point in time, managers find themselves in a position where
they have to impose sanctions of some form on a subordinate, ranging from oral or written
reprimands to suspension from work or even termination (Beyer & Trice, 1984; Butterfield,
Treviño, & Ball, 1996). Co-workers punish each other too, in the form of ostracism, scolding,
and even sabotage (e.g., Barker, 1993; Struthers, Miller, Boudens, & Briggs, 2001). Far from
being uncommon in the workplace, punishment is unlikely to vanish from the organizational
landscape (Sims, 1980; Treviño, 1992).
In the management literature, there has been substantial research on the consequences of
punishment, particularly in terms of its impact on the attitudes and subsequent behavior of the
punished individual (i.e., the issue of punishment “effectiveness”; e.g., Ball, Treviño, & Sims,
1993, 1994; Bennett, 1998; Podsakoff, Bommer, Podsakoff, & MacKenzie, 2006). Moreover,
the effects of punishment on the perceptions and performance of non-punished organizational
members have also been examined (e.g., Atwater, Camobreco, Dionne, Avolio, & Lau, 1997;
Niehoff, Paul, & Bunch, 1998; O'Reilly & Puffer, 1989; O'Reilly & Weitz, 1980; Treviño, 1992).
To a lesser extent, management researchers have studied the antecedents of punishment,
proposing a number of frameworks with which to further investigate managerial decisions to
punish and the choice of punishment form or tactic (Arvey & Jones, 1985; Butterfield et al.,
1996; Podsakoff, 1982). Although some conceptual and empirical research on punishment
1

antecedents has incorporated the role of organizational context variables in shaping punishment
decisions (e.g., Beyer & Trice, 1984; Klaas & Dell'omo, 1997), much of this research has
focused on formal aspects of the organizational context (e.g., formal organizational systems,
written policies and procedures, explicitly-stated managerial role requirements, or the presence
of a union). To date, there has been scant research on how perceptions of the organizational
context influence decision-making regarding punishment. Because an employee’s perceptions of
his or her workplace do not necessarily coincide with other “objective” or independent
assessments of that same workplace (Brief & Weiss, 2002), and because the influence of the
organizational context on punishment decisions (as well as many other individual behaviors, for
that matter) is likely to be mediated by individual perceptions (Leigh, Lucas, & Woodman,
1988), perceptions of the organizational context are arguably more crucial than objective aspects
of the organizational context in understanding and predicting individual employee decisionmaking and behavior, including the imposition of punishment (Bensman & Gerver, 1963; James,
Hater, Gent, & Bruni, 1978).
Understanding how perceptions of organizational context serve as antecedents to
punishment decisions has important implications for the theory and practice of managing
organizations. Given that managerial decisions with respect to disciplining employees do not
always reflect formal specifications for punishment established by their organizations (Blount,
2003; Fairhurst, Green, & Snavely, 1986; Klaas & Dell’omo, 1991), integrating perceptions of
organizational context into theories of punishment allows management researchers to develop
more comprehensive models of punishment in workplace settings. In terms of practice,
understanding the influence of these perceptions can provide managers with options to attenuate
severe or excessive punishment and to mitigate some of the unintended negative consequences
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that come with punishing subordinates, such as employee resentment (Day, 1971), perceived
leader ineffectiveness (Atwater, Dionne, Camobreco, Avolio, & Lau, 1998), or even legal
problems (Brett, Atwater, & Waldman, 2005).
In this dissertation, I examine how an individual’s punitive decision is shaped by his or
her perception of the extent to which the workplace is forgiving, which I refer to as perceived
organizational forgiveness. Although forgiveness and punishment are distinct constructs, they
have been inextricably linked by philosophers and theologians – and at times perceived as
inversely related (see Halling, 1994; Lewis, 1980; Senyshyn, 1998; Talbott, 1993; Tutu, 1999).
Research in psychology and management suggests that individual victims who have decided to
forgive their transgressor are less inclined to punish and take revenge against that transgressor
(e.g., Aquino, Tripp, & Bies, 2006; Bradfield & Aquino, 1999). However, we know little about
how one’s perceptions and experience of forgiveness in a workplace context shapes one’s
punitive reactions to transgressions in which one is not directly the victim, as is the case in many
organizational and even criminal justice contexts (Karstedt, 2002).
Building on the work of Cameron and colleagues (Cameron, Bright, & Caza, 2004;
Cameron & Caza, 2002), and integrating extant research on both forgiveness (e.g., Worthington,
2005) and punishment (e.g., Butterfield et al., 1996; Darley & Pittman, 2003), I present
propositions describing how and when perceived organizational forgiveness shapes one’s
punitive intent in response to ethical misconduct. In this chapter, I first present a theoretical
overview of punishment. I then introduce the concept of perceived organizational forgiveness
and develop a number of propositions regarding the relationship between perceived
organizational forgiveness and punitive intent. Lastly, I summarize the propositions and point
out their potential contributions to the study of punishment in the workplace. In Chapters Two
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and Three, I present two studies I conducted to empirically test the propositions in the model. In
Chapter Four, I discuss my findings and present conclusions as well as directions for future
research.
A Theoretical Overview of Punishment
Integrating elements from definitions proposed by Treviño (1992) and Vidmar and Miller
(1980), I define punishment as the imposition of a negative sanction on, or the withdrawal of a
positive outcome from, someone perceived to have violated a rule, norm, or expectation. In
conceptualizing punishment this way, I necessarily exclude non-contingent punishment behavior
(i.e., punishment imposed on an individual independent of whether that individual committed a
violation or not; e.g., Podsakoff, Todor, Grover, & Huber, 1984). I also relax a number of
assumptions inherent in some of the definitions previously provided by management scholars,
such as the assumption that the primary motivation underlying punishment is to see a decrease in
the frequency of some undesirable behavior (Ball & Sims, 1991) or the assumption that
punishment is applied by a superior (e.g., supervisors or managers) on a subordinate (Treviño,
1992). In the context of this dissertation, I focus on punishment intentions, which I refer to as
punitive intent, recognizing that there may be discrepancies between the intended severity of a
punishment and its actual implementation (cf. Ajzen, 1985). In addition, I will refer to the
individual tasked with deciding on the punishment to be imposed as the disciplinary agent.
In the context of a workplace, punishment may be used in response to various forms of
misconduct (Treviño, 1992), including poor performance (e.g., Heerwagen, Beach, & Mitchell,
1985; Trahan & Steiner, 1994), or interpersonal transgressions or “hurts” (Worthington, Berry,
Shivy, & Brownstein, 2005). In this dissertation, I consider punitive intent in response to ethical
misconduct, that is, behavior that falls short of the organization’s moral standards (Bersoff, 1999;
4

Treviño, 1992). Examples of these include pilfering office supplies, lying, or coming to work
under the influence of alcohol. Such misconduct is identified by a disciplinary agent either
directly (e.g., the supervisor actually witnesses a specific behavior or episode of behaviors), or
indirectly, in which case a flag or indicator suggests that misconduct has most likely occurred
(Arvey & Jones, 1985). Furthermore, in focusing on situations in which the disciplinary agent is
not directly the victim of the misconduct, I distinguish punishment from revenge, which may
also have punitive dimensions (Aquino, Tripp, & Bies, 2001, 2006; Zaibert, 2006).
Previous reviews and theoretical models of punishment in organizational settings (e.g.,
Arvey & Jones, 1985; Butterfield et al., 1996; Podsakoff, 1982) have identified the
organizational context as a class of antecedents that influences an individual’s decision to punish,
the choice of punishment tactic, and the severity of the punishment imposed. By context, I mean
the “situational opportunities and constraints that affect the occurrence and meaning of
organizational behavior as well as functional relationships between variables” (Johns, 2006, p.
386), including factors associated with the organization, events transpiring within an
organization, and social relationships existing within an organization. Setting aside features of
the misconduct itself, which constitute a class of antecedents on their own (see Arvey & Jones,
1985; Podsakoff, 1982), a number of workplace-related variables have been shown to influence
punishment behavior. For instance, a disciplinary agent’s span of control, his or her formal
reinforcement power (i.e., whether the disciplinary agent has the option of punishing and
rewarding, as opposed to simply punishing), and the structure and complexity of the task with
respect to which a negative sanction is imposed all shape the frequency with which punishment
is used, albeit in response to poor job performance (Podsakoff, 1982).
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With respect to sanctioning ethical misconduct in the workplace, the antecedent that has
received the most research attention has been the set of formal organizational policies regarding
punishment. Many, if not most, organizations have formal procedures specifying the conditions
and the extent to which sanctions and punishment may be imposed on employees (Arvey &
Jones, 1985; Cassell, Johnson, & Smith, 1997; Franklin & Pagan, 2006). Empirical evidence
suggests that the more a formal policy is perceived as applicable to misconduct, the more severe
a suspension from work is imposed on a violator (Beyer & Trice, 1984). Qualitative evidence
suggests that the mere existence of these disciplinary policies and procedures creates
expectations of punishment that compel managers to punish (Butterfield et al., 1996). However,
the more restrictive a formal disciplinary policy is, in terms of imposing stricter requirements or
more stringent standards with respect to defining offenses and documenting evidence regarding
offenses, the less managers are willing to impose severe punishment, such as dismissal (Klaas &
Dell'omo, 1997).
Underlying the effects of organizational policy on punishment decisions is the
disciplinary agents’ perceptions of such formal policies. Unfortunately, missing from extant
research is an examination of how punishment decisions are shaped by perceptions about aspects
of the organizational context, including the informal elements such as non-written norms and
rules formulated by employees themselves (e.g., Hollinger & Clark, 1982), non-institutionalized
socialization processes (e.g., Jones, 1986), and affective events in the workplace (Weiss &
Cropanzano, 1996).
To address this gap, I examine the relationship between one such perceptual variable,
perceived organizational forgiveness, and the severity with which one intends to punish an
individual found guilty of ethical misconduct.
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Perceived Organizational Forgiveness
Cameron and Caza (2002, p. 39) defined organizational forgiveness as an organization’s
capability “to foster collective abandonment of justified resentment, bitterness, and blame” and
to adopt “positive, forward-looking approaches in response to harm or damage.” In their work,
Cameron and colleagues conceptualized organizational forgiveness as an institutional inclination
to encourage members not to dwell on past offenses, even when no remorse is demonstrated
(Cameron et al., 2004; Cameron & Caza, 2002). As a dimension of organizational virtuousness,
Cameron and Caza (2002) described organizational forgiveness as being manifested in individual
actions as well as collective activities or processes that promote moral goodness and social
betterment. To clarify this conceptualization, I highlight several points.
First, the notion of organizational forgiveness necessarily involves an interpersonal
dimension (Cameron & Caza, 2002). Several scholars argue that forgiveness is an inherently
intrapersonal phenomenon (for a review, see Worthington, 2006), and research on forgiveness in
workplace settings has been consistent with this view, focusing on the affect and cognition
within the forgiving individual (e.g., Aquino, Grover, Goldman, & Folger, 2003; Aquino et al.,
2006). However, characterizing organizations as being more forgiving versus less forgiving is
possible only on the basis of overt manifestations, expressions, or signals of forgiveness. These
manifestations take the form of transactions and communication processes between offended
parties and the individual(s) perceived to have perpetrated the offense (Kelley, 1998; Waldron &
Kelley, 2005). It is possible that offended parties may constantly be forgiving co-workers who
have offended them by letting go of feelings of anger and negativity without overtly
demonstrating forgiving behaviors – a phenomenon referred to by Baumeister, Exline, and
Sommer (1998) as silent forgiveness. However, studying forgiveness as an organizational-level
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construct necessarily assumes the expression of forgiveness in some form between or among
organizational members. Such expressions of forgiveness may be indirect or non-verbal, by
way of acts such as smiling or resuming normal patterns of interaction with an offender (e.g.,
Montiel, 2000; Snook, 2005). As a caveat, although some scholars insist that forgiveness
necessarily involves replacing negative cognitions, emotions and motivations with positive ones
(e.g., Cameron & Caza, 2002; Wade & Worthington, 2005), there is some consensus that
forgiveness transpires when these cognitions, emotions, and motivations towards a transgressor
become less negative (McCullough, Fincham, & Tsang, 2003).
Second, even though organizational forgiveness inherently has an interpersonal
dimension, the harm or damage in response to which forgiveness may be forthcoming need not
necessarily be personal. Organizational members can abandon resentment and blame not only
over hurts or interpersonal offenses, but also over performance-related mistakes or missteps for
which their co-workers are responsible (Cameron et al., 2004). More importantly, however,
forgiving and forgoing blame do not preclude imposing negative sanctions on the individual(s)
responsible for the harm or damage, even in legal and clinical contexts (e.g., Enright, Eastin,
Golden, Sarinopoulos, & Freedman, 1992; Krapp, 2005). Even with reference to interpersonal
offenses, for which forgiveness may be seen as removing or cancelling an interpersonal debt, or
refraining from revenge (Aquino et al., 2006; Exline & Baumeister, 2000; Wallace, Exline, &
Baumeister, 2008), forgiving does not, by definition, mean the absence of sanctions or acts of
restitution. At least in principle, forgiveness does not imply minimizing, condoning, or ignoring
transgressions (e.g., Enright & Fitzgibbons, 2000; Murphy, 2002).
Third, although organizational forgiveness is conceptualized as an institutional capacity
and inclination, it is not an objective or formal property of an organization. This is not to
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discount that objective characteristics of the workplace associated with positive approaches to
dealing with harm and damage (e.g., formal rules and policies that urge employees to “move on”
and not dwell on mistakes) may make an organization appear forgiving. However, descriptions
and assertions regarding the extent to which an organization is forgiving are likely to arise from
employees’ interactions with each other and with elements of the organizational context, and
may be perceived differently from one employee to the next, as a facet-specific psychological
climate (Ashforth, 1985; James & Sells, 1981; Schneider & Reichers, 1983). Therefore,
examining perceived organizational forgiveness may prove to be a more fruitful avenue for
explaining variance in individual-level decisions, specifically punitive intent.
I define perceived organizational forgiveness as an individual’s perception and belief that
the organization and the organizational members are quick to forgive mistakes and missteps by
other organizational members. Conceptually, I distinguish perceived organizational forgiveness
from two constructs that may be closely related to it: psychological safety and managerial
ruthlessness. Perceived organizational forgiveness is narrower in scope than psychological
safety, a team-level climate construct defined as “a shared belief that the team is safe for
interpersonal risk taking” (Edmondson, 1999, p. 354). Psychological safety encompasses the
perception that one’s team members are open to discussing problems and issues, are willing to
help, and are appreciative of one’s uniqueness as well as contributions (Edmondson, 1999;
Edmondson, Bohmer, & Pisano, 2001). Perceived organizational forgiveness subsumes that
aspect of psychological safety concerning the belief that others in the organization “tolerate
failure without retaliation, renunciation, or guilt” (Schein & Bennis, 1965, p. 45), and that honest
mistakes can be made without fear of reprisal (Edmondson, 1996). With respect to managerial
ruthlessness, described by Rieple and Vyakarnam (1996) as the disregard of subordinates’
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feelings that managers exhibit when confronting subordinates, perceived organizational
forgiveness is not a polar opposite. Individuals who do not perceive their managers to be
ruthless may still tend to see their organization as less forgiving.
When an individual’s perceived organizational forgiveness is high, he or she is likely to
view work colleagues and supervisors as quick to forgive mistakes and missteps by other
organizational members. As such, the individual sees organizational members as refraining from
(1) blaming individuals responsible for mistakes, interpersonal conflict, or failure, (2) harboring
grudges or ill-feelings towards such individuals, and (3) engaging in acts of retribution. Such
high perceived organizational forgiveness might well have resulted from the individual’s
observation of instances in which other organizational members have actually refrained from
blaming, harboring grudges, and committing acts of revenge against individuals who have failed,
made mistakes, or hurt them (cf. Ashforth, 1985). To the extent that individuals seek to achieve
adaptive fit with their intra-organizational environment (Burke, Borucki, & Hurley, 1992), and
that perceived organizational forgiveness, as a climate variable, suggests what attitudes and
behaviors are acceptable (e.g., Dieterly & Schneider, 1974; Litwin & Stringer, 1968; White &
Lam, 2000), organizational members who perceive their workplace to be highly forgiving may
also collectively generate these incidents of forgiveness in response to mistakes. To wit, they
will also tend to be more forgiving and less likely to blame, harbor grudges, or engage in
revenge. Conversely, when an individual’s perceived organizational forgiveness is low, he or
she sees the workplace as being unforgiving. Such a perception might well be based on
observations of individuals experiencing negative sanctions for their missteps and bad decisions,
or work colleagues retaliating against each other over interpersonal conflicts. In the succeeding
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section, I discuss how perceived organizational forgiveness is likely to influence punitive intent
in response to ethical misconduct.
Perceived Organizational Forgiveness and Punitive Intent
Perceived organizational forgiveness may influence punitive intent in reaction to ethical
misconduct in two ways: by serving as a heuristic in making punishment decisions, and by
increasing a disciplinary agent’s ethical tolerance.
Perceived Organizational Forgiveness as a Heuristic
Because no disciplinary agent can have complete information regarding an unethical act,
such as the mitigating circumstances surrounding an offense, or the extent to which a perpetrator
was responsible for the offense, decision-making regarding punishment necessarily involves
judgment under uncertainty (see Englich, Mussweiler, & Strack, 2006). Not surprisingly,
disciplinary agents rely on heuristics or rules of thumb to simplify the process of punitive
judgment (cf. Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Presumably, they also actively seek to compare
their punishment judgments with those of other people (Festinger, 1954). In organizational
settings, individuals seek information on what attitudes and behaviors are appropriate in the
workplace from their organizational environment (Schneider, 1975). Thus, perceptions about the
organizational environment readily serve as rules of thumb that shape individual judgment and
behavior (Forehand & Gilmer, 1964). With respect to making punishment decisions, I propose
that perceived organizational forgiveness serves as a heuristic, an anchor that tends to bias
punitive intent in a downward manner (cf. Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).
An assumption underlying the anchoring process in judgment is the existence of a
“correct” solution (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). With respect to judgment involving
punishment for a given an offense, the level at which punishment is “ideal” or appropriate, as
11

opposed to excessive (e.g., Darley, Carlsmith, & Robinson, 2000; King, 1995) could be
considered the analogue of “correctness” of the punishment solution. Not surprisingly then,
experimental research has demonstrated that the magnitude of punishment imposed by
individuals is subject to anchoring effects. Participants asked to play the role of a juror impose
harsher verdicts (i.e., more severe convictions) when they consider options beginning with the
harshest possible verdict and subsequently move to the more lenient alternatives, than when they
do the opposite by considering options starting from the most lenient (Greenberg, Williams, &
O'Brien, 1986). Evidence also suggests that aside from the magnitude of conviction, punitive
damages and sentences (i.e., the punishments themselves) are anchored by prosecutor demands
(Englich & Mussweiler, 2001) and plaintiffs’ requests (Hastie, Schkade, & Payne, 1999). These
anchoring effects appear to be independent of an individual’s awareness that the anchors are
randomly generated (Englich et al., 2006). In addition, anchoring effects in imposing sentences
are true not only of jury-eligible lay persons (Hastie et al., 1999) but also of professional and
experienced prosecutors and judges (Englich & Mussweiler, 2001).
Although the standard experimental paradigm for investigating anchoring effects has
involved numerical anchors (see Epley & Gilovich, 2001), non-numerical information from
observed events, prior experience, and situational context may also serve as anchors for
quantitative and qualitative judgments (e.g., Epley, Keysar, Boven, & Gilovich, 2004;
McNamara & Bromiley, 1999; Roberts & Edwards, 1989). Perceived organizational forgiveness
is one such non-numeric yet relevant anchor for a disciplinary agent when determining what
punishment level is appropriate, particularly when she is presented with an ordinal set of
punishment options to choose from. This is because perceived organizational forgiveness
provides a reference, albeit qualitative, as to how individuals who have committed an offense are
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treated (or are supposed to be treated) by other organizational members. Specifically, when the
disciplinary agent’s perceived organizational forgiveness is high, she will tend to think in terms
of minimizing blame and negativity towards a transgressor. Consequently, she will view the
appropriate punishment for ethical misconduct as located on the lower end, rather than the higher
end, of the range of options available to her. In effect, high perceived organizational forgiveness
serves as an anchor that biases the disciplinary agent to choose punishment with a low severity.
On the other hand, when the disciplinary agent’s perceived organizational forgiveness is low, she
will tend to think in terms of holding a transgressor accountable and emphasizing the (negative)
repercussions of an offense. As a result, she will view the appropriate punishment as located at
the higher end of the range of punishment options. Effectively, low perceived organizational
forgiveness serves as an anchor that biases the disciplinary agent to select a more severe
punishment.
Perceived Organizational Forgiveness and Ethical Tolerance
Aside from acting as an anchor that downwardly influences punishment choices,
perceived organizational forgiveness also negatively influences punitive intent by increasing the
ethical tolerance of the disciplinary agent. By ethical tolerance, I mean the extent to which an
individual is willing to justify behavior that is unethical or at the least, ethically-suspect (Cullen,
Parboteeah, & Hoegl, 2004; Parboteeah, Bronson, & Cullen, 2005; Smith, 1997; Weeks,
Longenecker, McKinney, and Moore, 2005). As opposed to an individual’s ethical relativism,
defined as the extent to which one rejects universal moral rules in favor of rules based on
situation-specific contingencies or individual values (Forsyth, 1980), ethical tolerance is not
necessarily a stable individual difference trait. Moreover, ethical tolerance has been
conceptualized and operationalized in terms of the extent to which behaviors can be justified, as
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opposed to ethical relativism, which measures the perceived specificity (versus the
generalizability) of moral rules and standards across situations.
With high perceived organizational forgiveness comes the perception of signals and
behaviors from other organizational members that discourage not just negative feelings, but also
blaming and retaliation when things go wrong. Such signals and behaviors may be subtle and
indirect, are very rarely written down in formal documents, and are, for the most part,
experienced by individuals high in perceived organizational forgiveness through their personal
intra-organizational relationships. As such, they constitute an informal sanctioning system
(Tenbrunsel, Smith-Crowe, & Umphress, 2003) that provides guidelines with respect to dealing
with mistakes and interpersonal transgressions.
Typically, organizations have a formal sanctioning system that punishes individuals for
ethical misconduct (e.g., Arvey, Davis, & Nelson, 1984). An informal sanctioning system that
may exist even just in the mind of the individual high in perceived organizational forgiveness
presents a competing standard of appropriate and acceptable behavior simply by existing sideby-side with the formal sanctioning system. This competition between the formal and informal
sanctioning systems is exacerbated by the fine line that often distinguishes relational
transgressions and honest mistakes on one hand, and ethical misconduct on the other (see Arvey
& Jones, 1985). Presented with a situation that calls for a response to ethical misconduct, an
individual high in perceived organizational forgiveness will perceive two equally legitimate
bases for action. One is a formal sanctioning system that demands that the misconduct be
punished “by the book.” The other is an informal sanctioning system that is “forgiving” and
treats the misconduct as an honest mistake with respect to which the organization needs to move
past. Tenbrunsel, et al. (2003) argue that having such competing sanctioning systems results in a
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weak sanctioning system that leads individuals to engage in less sophisticated moral reasoning,
overlooking ethical dimensions that may arguably be clear cut. Over time, this weak sanctioning
system promotes ethical fading, (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004) or ethical degradation (Gino &
Bazerman, 2006), psychological processes with which individuals gradually fail to see the moral
components and implications of a decision or action. Thus, individuals high in perceived
organizational forgiveness eventually become more ethically tolerant.
In turn, this increased tolerance for ethical misconduct leads to lower punitive intent in
dealing with such misconduct. Faced with the task of sanctioning another member’s unethical
action, a disciplinary agent who is high in ethical tolerance is more likely to see the act as more
justifiable, and consequently less morally reprehensible, than does an agent who is low in ethical
tolerance. This lower sense of moral outrage over ethical misconduct leads the disciplinary
agent to impose a less severe sanction (Kahneman, Schkade, & Sunstein, 1998; Darley &
Pittman, 2003).
Conversely, low perceived organizational forgiveness presents no such competing
informal sanctioning system. Individuals who see their organizations as unforgiving will
perceive competing standards against which to evaluate ethical misconduct. Offenses of any
kind will be seen simply as offenses, whether they are honest mistakes, interpersonal hurts, or
acts of ethical misconduct. Consequently, individuals low in perceived organizational
forgiveness will be concerned with holding people found guilty of ethical misconduct
accountable to the extent that the formal sanctioning system specifies. Thus, low perceived
organizational forgiveness is unlikely to breed ethical tolerance, but instead increases the
likelihood that disciplinary agents will become more attentive to the unethical nature of the
misconduct and the need for an appropriate punishment response. Therefore, on average,
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disciplinary agents low in perceived organizational forgiveness will tend to punish more severely
than those who are high in perceived organizational forgiveness.
Proposition 1: Perceived organizational forgiveness will be negatively related to
punitive intent in response to ethical misconduct, such that disciplinary agents who
perceive their work organization to be forgiving will be less punitive than those who
perceive their work organization to be unforgiving.
Moderating Influences
Research on decision-making involving punishment suggests that there are clusters of
antecedents that potentially moderate the influence of a disciplinary agent’s perceived
organizational forgiveness on his or her punitive intent in response to ethical misconduct. These
clusters of variables revolve around the disciplinary agent and the ethical misconduct itself.
The Disciplinary Agent
Empirical research exploring individual-level antecedents of punishment decisionmaking suggests that stable individual differences on the part of the disciplinary agent shape his
or her attitudes towards punishment decisions. For instance, Sargent (2004) reported evidence
from three studies suggesting that individuals who have a low need for cognition (i.e., those who
typically avoid effortful cognitive activity; Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996) tend to be
very supportive of punitive measures in response to general societal crime, compared to those
high in the need for cognition.
In addition, an individual’s beliefs and values also influence the severity with which he or
she punishes another found guilty of a transgression. For instance, with respect to punishing
unethical business transactions, Giacalone, Fricker, and Beard (1995) found evidence that one’s
ethical ideology (Forsyth, 1980) was related to one’s punitive reactions to certain business
16

transgressions. Specifically, individuals who are low in ethical relativism tend to be harsher in
punishing individuals found to have engaged in bribing a foreign official than those high in
ethical relativism. As another example, one’s belief in and endorsement of the Protestant Work
Ethic (PWE; Mirels & Garrett, 1971; Weber, 1904/1958) is positively correlated with the
severity with which one imposes negative sanctions (Christopher, Marek, & May, 2003;
Christopher & Schlenker, 2005). Because individuals high in PWE believe that one’s economic
fortunes can only be the result of one’s hard work, they tend to make internal, as opposed to
external, attributions for an individual’s behavior. As such, individuals high in PWE tend to
view individuals found guilty of ethical misconduct as being primarily responsible for their
actions, and consequently, tend to punish more severely. Finally, substantial empirical evidence
suggests that right-wing authoritarianism – a tendency to value conformity, tradition, security,
and power – is positively related not only to support for punitive measures already imposed on a
guilty transgressor, but also to punitive intent in response to fictional transgressions (e.g.,
Feather, 1996; Griffitt & Garcia, 1979; Lerner, Goldberg, & Tetlock, 1998).
Beyond individual differences in stable dispositions or values, the situational context of
the individual tasked to punish another found guilty of ethical misconduct may also influence the
severity of his or her punitive intent. Here, I focus on two such contextual factors: the
disciplinary agent’s accountability and the transgression experience salient to him or her.
Accountability. Accountability may be defined as “being answerable to audiences for
performing up to certain prescribed standards, thereby fulfilling obligations, duties, expectations,
and other charges” (Schlenker, Britt, Pennington, Murphy, & Doherty, 1994, p. 634). An
individual who is accountable is one who, implicitly or explicitly, expects to be called on to
justify his or her beliefs, feelings, and actions to some audience (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999).
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Individuals who make decisions in organizational settings, including those who have to impose
negative sanctions for ethical misconduct in organizations, are likely to experience such
accountability for their choices (Quinn & Schlenker, 2002).
Empirical evidence supports the assertion that accountability has the potential to induce
more complex and critical thinking, influencing how individuals encode and analyze
information, thereby attenuating the impact of heuristics and judgmental biases (e.g., SiegelJacobs & Yates, 1996; Tetlock, 1985; Tetlock & Kim, 1987; Webster, Richter, & Kruglanski,
1996). With respect to making judgments regarding the guilt of fictional transgressors,
accountable individuals were less likely (than those who were unaccountable) to be influenced
by the order in which evidence and information were presented (Tetlock, 1983), and were more
likely to consider situational constraints faced by a transgressor, before assigning attributions of
responsibility (Lerner et al., 1998).
That said, accountability is not a unitary phenomenon. There are various types of
accountability that differ along various dimensions, such as the extent to which the views of the
audience are known and the degree to which that audience is well-informed (Lerner & Tetlock,
1999, 2003). Cumulative evidence suggests that there are only certain conditions under which
accountability elicits the cognitive effort necessary to reduce judgmental biases, and that under
some other conditions, accountability may even amplify bias, ironically, through effortful
thinking (Lerner & Tetlock, 2003).
In particular, assuming that the decision-maker’s audience desires accuracy in judgment,
is knowledgeable about the decision task, and has a legitimate basis for asking the individual to
justify her decision, Lerner and Tetlock (2003) proposed that a crucial consideration is extent to
which the views and expectations of that audience are known to the accountable decision-maker.
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Empirical evidence (e.g., Quinn & Schlenker, 2002; Tetlock, Skitka, & Boettger, 1989; see
Lerner & Tetlock, 2003 for a review) suggests that when a decision-maker is aware of the
specific views, or even just the general preferences, of a legitimate and competent audience, she
is more likely not only to engage in conformity and to adopt what she sees as the socially
acceptable position, but also to engage in defensive bolstering (Tetlock, et al., 1989): effortful
thinking to selectively use information, with the view of justifying a decision. On the other
hand, when a decision-maker is unaware of the views or expectations of her audience, her desire
not to appear foolish to this audience is more likely to motivate her to engage in effortful
thinking and pre-emptive self-criticism.
More specific to decision-making involving punishment, Pennington and Schlenker
(1999) reported that individuals recommended harsher punishments for a student accused of
cheating when they expected to justify their recommendation in a face-to-face meeting with a
representative from the student honor court than when the meeting was with the accusing
professor herself. That the honor court representative was described as having no preference as
to the outcome of the case (e.g., with respect to leniency towards the accused) underscores the
influence of accountability to an “unknown audience” on punitive intent. In a follow up study,
where the professor was reported to have expressed the opinion that punishment should be
commensurate with the seriousness of an offense such as the reported cheating, participants
accountable to this professor recommended a harsher punishment than those who were scheduled
to meet (and were therefore accountable to) the accused student (Pennington & Schlenker, 1999).
Importantly then, the potential moderating influence of accountability on the negative
relationship between perceived organizational forgiveness and punitive intent will depend on the
disciplinary agent’s knowledge and expectations of the audience to whom she is accountable.
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When the disciplinary agent is accountable to an intra-organizational audience, as is quite often
the case in organizations (Quinn & Schlenker, 2002), the effect of perceived organizational
forgiveness on punitive intent will likely be amplified. More specifically, an agent whose
perceived organizational forgiveness is high will tend to punish a transgressor even less severely
when she is accountable to one or more of her colleagues than when she is not accountable at all.
To begin with, the disciplinary agent’s high perceived organizational forgiveness will operate to
anchor her decision on the lower end of a range of punishment options. When she is made
accountable to other members of the organization, the prospect of having to justify her “low”
punishment choice to an audience whom she expects to value giving second chances and
minimizing blame will serve to motivate her to defensively bolster her decision. Such defensive
bolstering is likely to take the form of effortful thought involving greater attention to cues, facts,
and even information gaps that may support such a low punishment decision, and conversely,
less attention to cues, facts, and information gaps that may suggest an increase in punishment
level. As a result, this disciplinary agent is unlikely to adjust her initial punishment choice
upward, and with additional information supporting a low punishment, may even be likely to
punish even less severely, if at all possible. Thus, on average, a disciplinary agent high in
perceived organizational forgiveness will tend to punish less severely when she is accountable to
an intra-organizational audience than when she is not accountable to anyone at all.
Analogously, a disciplinary agent whose perceived organizational forgiveness is low will
tend to punish a transgressor even more severely when she is accountable to another
organizational member than when she is not accountable at all. Faced with an increased
likelihood of having to defend her “high” punishment choice to an audience whom she expects to
think in terms of blaming and holding grudges, this agent is also likely to engage in defensive
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bolstering. This time, though, her attention and cognitive effort will be directed towards cues,
facts, and information gaps that support severe punishment, or possibly an increase in punitive
response. Consequently, she is less likely to adjust her initial punishment choice downward, and
may even be likely to impose a more severe punishment, if at all possible. On average,
therefore, a disciplinary agent low in perceived organizational forgiveness will tend to punish
more severely when held accountable to an intra-organizational audience, than when held
unaccountable. The net effect is an amplification of the negative relationship between perceived
organizational forgiveness and punitive intent.
Underlying this amplifying effect are two important assumptions pointed out by Lerner
and Tetlock (2003). The first is that the disciplinary agent learns that she or he is accountable
prior to evaluating the ethical misconduct and considering options for punishment severity. This
pre-decisional timing of accountability awareness is a necessary condition to motivate
individuals to become more conscious of their thinking processes and in this case, to strategically
be selective of information they need to justify their punishment decision to their audience
(Tetlock & Kim, 1987; Tetlock et al., 1989). While post-decisional accountability may have the
potential to enhance defensive bolstering, it may also not have an effect on an individual’s
cognitive processes (Lambert, Cronen, Chasteen, & Lickel, 1996; Tetlock et al., 1989; see Lerner
& Tetlock, 1999 for a review).
The second assumption is that the disciplinary agent does not need to be trained to
acquire special or technical skills necessary to make the necessary judgment or decision. Predecisional accountability will not have any influence on attenuating bias when such bias comes
from not knowing crucial decision rules, or when the decision-maker is unable to correct his or
her own mental processes (e.g., Wilson & Brekke, 1994). Because punishing transgressors
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found guilty of ethical misconduct is unlikely to involve legal expertise, this assumption is
tenable. Thus, individuals who perceive the workplace to be forgiving and who are accountable
to an intra-organizational audience will tend to be less punitive than those who also perceive the
workplace to be forgiving but are not accountable. Conversely, individuals who perceive the
workplace to be unforgiving and who are accountable to an intra-organizational audience will
tend to be more punitive than those who also perceive the workplace to be unforgiving but are
not accountable.
Proposition 2: Accountability to an intra-organizational audience will amplify the
negative relationship between perceived organizational forgiveness and punitive intent,
such that the relationship will be stronger among disciplinary agents whose
accountability is high rather than low.
Salient transgression experience. Every human being has committed some form of
transgression, either of the relational (interpersonal) or non-relational type (e.g., Worthington et
al., 2005). Assuming that a transgression has been observed by a victim or by another
individual, transgressors in organizational settings are likely to have experienced being forgiven,
or conversely, being unforgiven for what they have done (or what they have failed to do). Such
an experience of being forgiven or unforgiven can influence the relationship between
organizational forgiveness and punitive reactions to transgressions. As an affective event (Weiss
& Cropanzano, 1996), being forgiven (or unforgiven) generates emotional reactions, which in
turn serve as antecedents to more distal attitudes and behavioral intent. Because the process of
imposing punishment involves a diversity of emotions that may restrict or balance each other
(Karstedt, 2002), such an affective event has the potential of shaping punitive intent.
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When an individual perceives her workplace to be highly forgiving, the experience of
being personally forgiven will be perceived as normal because it is consistent with expectations
about how co-workers deal with mistakes and failures (i.e., not dwelling on these past mistakes;
e.g., Kahneman & Miller, 1986). As a result, such an experience is unlikely to shape her
punitive intent in response to workplace transgressions. Analogously, when a disciplinary agent
sees the organization as unforgiving, the experience of not being forgiven by a colleague will be
perceived as consistent with expectations generated by this psychological climate.
Consequently, being unforgiven will exert only a minor influence, if any, on the punitive
decision-making process.
It is when a disciplinary agent’s perceived organizational forgiveness is high that her
experience of being unforgiven influences her punitive intent. That is, when the disciplinary
agent experiences being unforgiven in a workplace she views as forgiving, such an experience
becomes salient. This experience then triggers two emotional states that potentially make an
individual intend to punish a transgressor more severely than she would have otherwise done.
The first is guilt. Being unforgiven generates guilt, an unpleasant affective state resulting
from having committed a transgression that one regrets and from having experienced social
exclusion in the form of rejection by a victim (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994;
Ingersoll-Dayton & Krause, 2005; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Ironically perhaps, the guilt
associated with being unforgiven is a discrete moral emotion that promotes and encourages
responsible, normative, and moral future behavior on the part of the guilty individual (Tangney
& Dearing, 2002; Turner & Stets, 2006). As an emotion that is linked to one’s behavior (as
opposed to one’s personhood or identity – the contrasting emotion of shame), guilt motivates an
unforgiven transgressor to compensate for the negative consequences of his or her actions by
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some positive action, such as confessing or making amends, or even being more compliant with
norms and rules (e.g., Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007). In the workplace, this means that
individuals experiencing guilt tend to act in ways consistent and compliant with normative
(expected) standards of behavior in their organization, which would include imposing negative
sanctions on individuals who have committed minor acts of ethical misconduct. Faced with a
decision to punish an individual, unforgiven disciplinary agents would therefore be less
susceptible to the ethical fading that high perceived organizational forgiveness may encourage in
judging the ethicality of misconduct. Their desire to hue to moral and normative behavior may
lead these unforgiven agents to be more likely to make a distinction between honest mistakes and
ethical breaches. Consequently, even when they perceive the organization to be forgiving, these
unforgiven disciplinary agents are likely to punish ethical misconduct more severely than agents
who have experienced being forgiven.
Second, empirical evidence suggests that being unforgiven also generates resentment and
anger toward the individual refusing to forgive (Snook, 2005). Such anger, in particular, may
result from the unforgiven individual’s frustration at not obtaining an anticipated gratifying
experience (Berkowitz, 1989), that is, the gratifying experience expected to follow an appeal for
forgiveness from the victim. In addition, anger may occur because the unforgiven individual’s
goal of “making things right with the victim” has been blocked (Turner & Stets, 2006), in this
case, by the unforgiving victim herself. To the extent that such anger is repressed by an
unforgiven disciplinary agent, it tends to be displaced and directed towards others, particularly
those who cannot retaliate or negatively sanction back (Turner & Stets, 2006). In other words,
an unforgiven disciplinary agent may view the decision to punish another individual as an outlet
for expressing the agent’s anger and negative emotions (Xiao & Houser, 2005).
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However, the moderating effect of being unforgiven on the relationship between
perceived organizational forgiveness and punitive intent is not symmetric with that of being
forgiven. When a disciplinary agent who perceives her organization to be unforgiving
experiences being forgiven, she will also see the experience as not normal. It will, therefore,
become more salient that might otherwise be the case. Being forgiven for a mistake or an
interpersonal transgression, when one expects the opposite, can result in positive feelings such as
a general sense of relief and gratitude toward the forgiver (Enright & The Human Development
Study Group, 1996; Witvliet, Ludwig, & Bauer, 2002). However, although being forgiven leads
to such positive emotions and also reduces (or at least has a great potential to reduce) guilt
feelings on the part of the transgressor (Murray, 2002; Reiss, 2004), empirical evidence suggests
that it does not completely eliminate feelings of guilt (Estrada-Hollenbeck & Heatherton, 1998).
In an organization perceived to be unforgiving, the positive inequity resulting from the
perception that forgiveness was not completely deserved can also sustain some of these feelings
of guilt (Baumeister et al., 1994; Kelln & Ellard, 1999). Perceiving the organization to be
unforgiving, a disciplinary agent who has experienced being forgiven may still experience guilt
that will make her committed (possibly even more committed!) to normative, expected behavior
(i.e., upholding ethical standards and punishing ethical misconduct). Ironically, perhaps, being
forgiven, is then likely to engender the same degree of punitive intent as the experience of being
unforgiven, as long as the organization is perceived as unforgiving. Confronted with the
decision to punish an individual found guilty of ethical misconduct, a disciplinary agent who has
experienced being forgiven may be inclined to punish an individual to the same extent as an
unforgiven individual, given her low perceived organizational forgiveness.
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Thus, disciplinary agents who perceive the workplace to be forgiving but who have
experienced being unforgiven will tend to be more punitive than those who also perceive the
workplace to be forgiving but have experienced being forgiven. In addition, disciplinary agents
who perceive the workplace to be unforgiving but who have experienced being forgiven will
tend to be as punitive as those who also perceive the workplace to be unforgiving and have
experienced being unforgiven. Effectively, perceived organizational forgiveness will be
negatively related to punitive intent when the experience salient to the agent is one in which she
has been forgiven. When the experience salient to the agent is one in which she has been
unforgiven, perceived organizational forgiveness is unlikely to influence punitive intent. In other
words,
Proposition 3: A disciplinary agent’s salient transgression experience will moderate the
relationship between perceived organizational forgiveness and punitive intent, such that
perceived organizational forgiveness and punitive intent will be negatively related when
the agent’s salient experience is one of being forgiven and unrelated when the agent’s
salient experience is one of being unforgiven.
The Ethical Misconduct
Assuming that punishment is imposed in response to a transgression or an act of ethical
misconduct, it is reasonable to expect that characteristics of the act of ethical misconduct itself
are likely to influence the punitive response towards the transgressor. Based on extant research,
at least two dimensions of the offense itself have the potential to moderate the relationship
between perceived organizational forgiveness and punitive intent: the severity of the negative
consequences of the misconduct to the organization, and the existence of mitigating
circumstances.
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Severity of negative consequences. Disciplinary agents, and individuals in general, may
justify their punitive intent in reaction to ethical misconduct using a variety of reasons, including
utilitarian rationales such as sending a strong signal to deter future wrongdoing and rehabilitating
transgressors (cf. Darley & Pittman, 2003; Graham, Weiner, & Zucker, 1997). However,
empirical research (e.g., Carlsmith, Darley & Robinson, 2002; Darley et al., 2000) suggests that
the severity with which individuals punish is most sensitive to factors uniquely associated with a
“just deserts” or retributive motive (Kant, 1790/1952; Rawls, 1955); that is, punishment is a way
to restore an imbalance in the scales of justice created by a transgression, and therefore, the
perpetrator deserves to be negatively sanctioned in proportion to the harm done.
Indeed, lay perceptions of the severity of organizational or “white-collar” crime are based
on the extent of the damage done, with those resulting in physical harm to some victim (e.g.,
launching an unsafe product) rated as more severe than those resulting in financial or economic
consequences (Meier & Short, 1983; Schrager & Short, 1980). This is consistent with Jones’
(1991) ethical decision-making model, which posits that the magnitude of the consequences of
an act or issue compels individuals to use ethical reasoning in making ethical judgments.
Furthermore, experimental evidence does support the proposition that, at least naively,
individuals assign punishment proportional to the magnitude of the negative consequences of the
misconduct. The greater the egregiousness of an offense, experimentally manipulated in terms
of the extent to which it results in harm to some victim, the more severe the punishment
individuals assign to a fictional transgressor (Carlsmith et al., 2002; Casey & O'Connell, 1999;
Miller, Chino, Harney, Haines, & Saavedra, 1986; Oswald, Orth, Aeberhard, & Schneider,
2005). Although punitive intent may also be explained by a disciplinary agent’s sense of moral
outrage resulting from perceived malice and intentionality on the part of a transgressor (Darley &

27

Pittman, 2003; Kahneman et al., 1998), meta-analytic evidence suggests that when the outcome
of a negative incident, such as ethical misconduct, is more (as opposed to less) severe, observers
attribute greater responsibility to the individual found guilty of the incident and perceive that
individual to be more deserving of punishment (Robbennolt, 2000).
Thus, the extent to which an act of ethical misconduct results in serious damage – to
individual members of the organization, or to the organization as a whole – will potentially
moderate the relationship between perceived organizational forgiveness and punitive intent in
reaction such misconduct. The more severe the damage resulting from an act of ethical
misconduct, the more salient such damage becomes as a metric on the basis of which punitive
intent is formed. Consequently, a disciplinary agent devotes less attention to other available
heuristics, such as her perceived organizational forgiveness, for judging the seriousness of the
misconduct.
In other words, disciplinary agents who perceive the workplace to be forgiving will tend
to be more punitive when the ethical misconduct results in negative consequences that are high
in severity than when the misconduct results in negative consequences that are low in severity.
Disciplinary agents who perceive the workplace to be unforgiving will tend to be as punitive
when the ethical misconduct results in negative consequences that are high in severity as when
the misconduct results in negative consequences that are low in severity. Effectively then, the
negative relationship between perceived organizational forgiveness and punitive intent will only
be manifest when the misconduct results in negative consequences that are low in severity.
Conversely, when the misconduct results in negative consequences that are high in severity, the
disciplinary agent will tend to punish severely, regardless of her perceived organizational
forgiveness. Thus,
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Proposition 4: The severity of the negative consequence of the ethical misconduct will
moderate the relationship between perceived organizational forgiveness and punitive
intent, such that perceived organizational forgiveness and punitive intent will be
negatively related when the ethical misconduct results in negative consequences that are
low in severity, and unrelated when the ethical misconduct results in negative
consequences that are high in severity.
Mitigating circumstances. Aside from the negative consequences of the misconduct,
other facts and circumstances surrounding the offense may also influence punitive reactions.
Negative events, such as ethical misconduct, trigger attributional processes that observers and
disciplinary agents use in judging the extent to which the transgressor was culpable for the
offense, the extent to which the ethical misconduct was within the control of the transgressor,
and the extent to which the offense was intentional on the part of the transgressor (cf. Weiner,
1985). Any evidence of mitigating circumstances, in particular, may serve as a basis for
observers and disciplinary agents to temper responsibility attributions or blame attributions
regarding the misconduct (see Malle, in press; Weiner, 2006). Consequently, the degree to
which a transgressor is perceived to be responsible and blameworthy for the ethical misconduct
determines punitive reactions towards that transgressor (Alicke, 2000; Schlenker et al., 1994).
Empirical evidence from the work of Weiner and colleagues (e.g., Weiner, Graham, &
Reyna, 1997) suggests that individuals begin their punishment decision-making process with an
inference about an individual’s responsibility for the offense. Based on the actor-observer
asymmetry in attribution (Jones & Nisbett, 1971), a disciplinary agent is more likely, at least
initially, to see the ethical misconduct as resulting from factors internal to the transgressor (e.g.,
stable internal dispositions, intentions), although cumulative empirical evidence suggests that
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this tendency to make internal attributions might be true only under a specific set of conditions
(Malle, 2006). Individual differences in attributional styles (e.g., Grasmick & McGill, 1994)
may also increase the likelihood that a disciplinary agent would attribute the misconduct to the
transgressor’s character, leading the agent to hold the transgressor primarily responsible for the
misconduct and consequently, to intend to punish the transgressor very severely (e.g., Cochran,
Boots, & Heide, 2003; Young, 1991).
Nevertheless, when asked to make attributions regarding the responsibility of a
transgressor for acts and behaviors constituting ethical misconduct, observers and disciplinary
agents do not just rely on these initial inferences. Schlenker (1997) argues that they also take
into account other available facts and details that may inform this judgment, including the
transgressor’s autonomy and volitional control in the course of the misconduct. Aside from
these mostly objective and observable details surrounding the misconduct, other sources of such
information may include accounts (such as excuses and justifications) that transgressors give to
explain the misconduct (e.g., Scott & Lyman, 1968; Riordan, Marlin, & Kellogg, 1983).
Based on all of this information, disciplinary agents who perceive transgressors as having
a lesser degree of responsibility for the ethical misconduct will experience sympathy for the
transgressor and will tend to punish less severely. Conversely, when this additional set of
information leads the disciplinary agent to attribute responsibility and blame primarily to the
transgressor, the agent experiences anger towards the offender, which increases the likelihood of
her imposing a more severe punishment in response to ethical misconduct (Greitemeyer &
Weiner, 2006; Weiner, 2004, 2006).
Thus, evidence of mitigating circumstances potentially moderates the relationship
between perceived organizational forgiveness and punitive intent. When a disciplinary agent’s
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perceived organizational forgiveness is high, she is likely to focus her attention away from
blaming and blame attributions. Because evidence of mitigating circumstances is essentially a
cue suggesting reduced blameworthiness on the part of the transgressor, it is unlikely to
constitute a central or crucial consideration in her decision-making process. In other words,
disciplinary agents who perceive the workplace to be forgiving will tend to be as punitive when
there is legitimate evidence of mitigating circumstances as when there is none. Hence, the
influence of perceived organizational forgiveness on the disciplinary agent’s inclination to
punish the transgressor even less severely will be minimal, if any.
On the other hand, when a disciplinary agent’s perceived organizational forgiveness is
low, she is more likely to be attuned to stimuli and information that speak to blame attributions.
To the extent that the evidence of mitigating circumstances is credible and legitimate, she is
more likely to take such evidence into consideration in making punishment decisions. And
because evidence of mitigating circumstances displaces some of the responsibility for the
misconduct to factors external to the transgressor (e.g., Schlenker, Pontari, & Christopher, 2001),
the disciplinary agent is likely to perceive the offender not to be completely responsible for the
misconduct. Consequently, the severity of the punitive response decreases. In other words,
disciplinary agents who perceive the workplace to be unforgiving will tend to be less punitive
when there is legitimate evidence of mitigating circumstances than when there is none.
An important caveat is that the evidence of mitigating circumstances should be perceived
by the disciplinary agent to be legitimate (cf. Scott & Lyman, 1968). Attempting to blame the
ethical misconduct on situational forces and present these as mitigating circumstances can
backfire on a transgressor. For instance, a study by Bellizzi and Norvell (1991) revealed that
excuses provided by a fictional salesperson described as being found guilty of committing ethical
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misconduct in a vignette did not only fail to neutralize participant punitive intent, but also
resulted in harsher disciplinary intentions.
To summarize,
Proposition 5: Evidence of mitigating circumstances will moderate the relationship
between perceived organizational forgiveness and punitive intent, such that the negative
relationship will be weaker when there is evidence of mitigating circumstances than when
there is none.
Summary
In this chapter, I have proposed that perceived organizational forgiveness, an individual
perception of the extent to which the organization and the other organizational members are
forgiving, shapes punitive intent in response to ethical misconduct in the workplace. I have also
proposed a number of moderators which either amplify or attenuate this relationship. Figure 1
summarizes these relationships.

Figure 1 A Model Linking Perceived Organizational Forgiveness and Punitive Intent
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In proposing this model, I hope to have extended research into punishment, not only by
incorporating the disciplinary agent’s perspective of the context into a model explaining punitive
intent, but also by drawing attention to the boundedly rational nature of decision-making
regarding punishment (cf. Simon, 1955). Although disciplinary agents may engage in deliberate
reasoning in the form of weighing available evidence of misconduct and applying formal
disciplinary policies, I have argued that their perceptions of organizational forgiveness make
their punishment decisions subject to other, less conscious cognitive processes such as anchoring
and ethical fading. Moreover, I have also explained how a number of factors involving the
disciplinary agent and the ethical misconduct itself potentially moderate the relationship between
perceived organizational forgiveness and punitive intent, again through mechanisms that may
aptly be described as boundedly rational. In the succeeding chapters, I present studies testing the
main effect and the moderating effects I have proposed.
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CHAPTER TWO: LAB STUDY
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this experimental study is to examine whether perceived organizational
forgiveness influences individuals to punish someone found guilty of ethical misconduct less
severely than they otherwise might have done. In addition, this study was designed to
investigate whether a disciplinary agent’s accountability to an intra-organizational audience and
the magnitude of negative consequences of the misconduct separately moderate the relationship
between perceived organizational forgiveness and punitive intent. Through an in-basket
simulation in which I manipulated perceived organizational forgiveness, accountability, and
severity of negative consequences, I tested propositions one, two, and four. Consistent with
experimental studies of punishment decision-making in social psychology (e.g., Carlsmith et al.,
2002), I operationalized punitive intent in two ways: (i) as a measure of intention to punish, and
(ii) as a proposed sanction. Accordingly, I tested the following pairs of hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1a: Perceived organizational forgiveness will be negatively related to
intentions to punish in response to ethical misconduct, such that disciplinary agents who
perceive their work organization to be forgiving will report lower levels of intention to
punish than agents who perceive their work organization to be unforgiving.
Hypothesis 1b: Perceived organizational forgiveness will be negatively related to
proposed sanctions in response to ethical misconduct, such that disciplinary agents who
perceive their work organization to be forgiving will propose less severe sanctions than
agents who perceive their work organization to be unforgiving.
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Hypothesis 2a: Accountability to an intra-organizational audience will amplify the
negative relationship between perceived organizational forgiveness and intention to
punish, such that the relationship will be stronger among disciplinary agents whose
accountability is high rather than low.
Hypothesis 2b: Accountability to an intra-organizational audience will amplify the
negative relationship between perceived organizational forgiveness and proposed
sanctions, such that the relationship will be stronger among disciplinary agents whose
accountability is high rather than low.
Hypothesis 3a: The severity of the negative consequence of the ethical misconduct will
moderate the relationship between perceived organizational forgiveness and intention to
punish, such that perceived organizational forgiveness and intention to punish will be
negatively related when the ethical misconduct results in negative consequences that are
low in severity, and unrelated when the ethical misconduct results in negative
consequences that are high in severity.
Hypothesis 3b: The severity of the negative consequence of the ethical misconduct will
moderate the relationship between perceived organizational forgiveness and proposed
sanctions, such that perceived organizational forgiveness and proposed sanction will be
negatively related when the ethical misconduct results in negative consequences that are
low in severity, and unrelated when the ethical misconduct results in negative
consequences that are high in severity.
A diagram of the hypotheses being tested is presented in Figure 2.
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Figure 2 Model for Lab Study
Method
Sample and Design
One hundred seventy-three working undergraduate business students at a public
university in the southeastern United States voluntarily participated in this in-basket study.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of eight conditions of the 2 (perceived organizational
forgiveness: high/low) x 2 (accountability: yes/no) x 2 (severity of negative consequences:
high/low) factorial design. All of the participants reported working at least 5 hours a week for
an average of 28.32 hours a week (SD = 11.14), with the average company tenure being 2.68
years (SD = 2.57). 36.5% reported that they were working full-time. The average participant
was 23.75 years old (SD = 3.59). Approximately 43.4% were female and 71.1% were nonHispanic Caucasian (11.0% self-identified as Hispanic, 7.5% as Black, and 6.4% as Asian).
Procedure
After reading a cover letter providing participants an overview of the study and their
research-related rights, they completed an in-basket exercise. The exercise is a modified version
of earlier forms developed and used by Brief and colleagues to measure participant intent to
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engage in various behaviors, such as fraudulent financial reporting and employment
discrimination (Brief, Dietz, Cohen, Pugh, & Vaslow, 2000; Brief, Dukerich, Brown, & Brett,
1996). In this exercise, participants assumed the role of an assistant manager, Chris Meyer,
working for a fictional restaurant, JAKE’S. Presented with a series of memos, the participants
indicated their decisions by using the options provided. I deemed the in-basket an appropriate
technique for measuring the variables of interest because it allowed me to experimentally
manipulate the context within which decisions are made and to measure behavioral intent,
particularly punitive intent, in a way that was subtle and realistic (Brass & Oldham, 1976;
Dukerich, Milliken, & Cowan, 1990).
To provide participants a context within which they were tasked to make a decision
involving punishment, I asked them to read the following vignette, based on a scenario
developed by McMahon and Harvey (2006). The vignette appeared as an in-basket memo from
James Walters, JAKE’S Controller, from whom Chris Meyer expected a short report and
recommendation regarding an act of ethical misconduct.
As per your request, here is what I found out about Steve Atkins, our assistant in
charge of ordering and receiving restaurant equipment and supplies, based on reliable
information I have gathered from other employees. In the delivery for the week ending
July 6, 2007, Steve discovered an espresso maker that, by some mistake, was not ordered
and did not appear on the invoice. Steve took the espresso maker home. Our supplier,
Jensen Marketing, did not know about Steve’s actions until early last week.
The full version of this memo, including the experimental manipulations discussed in the
succeeding section, is presented as Appendix A. I informed the participants of the opportunity to
be debriefed regarding the purpose and nature of the study, once the study was complete.
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Experimental Manipulations
Perceived organizational forgiveness. Perceived organizational forgiveness was
manipulated through (1) the description of the fictional restaurant, JAKE’S, that participants read
at the beginning of the in-basket, prior to reading the various memos and (2) a statement by
another senior manager of JAKE’S, repeating or echoing the company slogan. Participants
randomly assigned to the high perceived organizational forgiveness condition read the following
description of JAKE’S:
…employees describe JAKE’S as a very forgiving workplace. Managers and
subordinates alike avoid blaming, finger-pointing, and dwelling on failures, past
mistakes, and bad decisions. In addition, people who work at JAKE’S tend to overcome
grudges, resentment, or ill-feelings towards co-workers who may have offended them. In
casual conversations, JAKE’S employees suggest that if there were to be a company
mantra, it would be “Everybody deserves a second chance around here.”
Moreover, in an in-basket memo in which they were asked to make a decision regarding
punishing an employee (the punishment intention being the dependent measure, explained in a
succeeding sub-section), participants in this condition read a statement from another manager
echoing this description of JAKE’S: “Of course, you know what people say around here:
everyone deserves a second chance.”
Conversely, participants assigned to the low perceived organizational forgiveness
condition read the following description of JAKE’S:
…employees describe JAKE’S as a very unforgiving workplace. Managers and
subordinates alike tend to engage in blaming and finger-pointing, and to dwell on
failures, past mistakes, and bad decisions. In addition, people who work at JAKE’S tend
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to harbor grudges, resentment, or ill-feelings towards co-workers who may have offended
them. In casual conversations, JAKE’S employees suggest that if there were to be a
company slogan, it would be “Zero tolerance” or “There’s no such thing as a second
chance.”
Analogously, in the memo in which they had to make a punishment decision, participants in this
condition read a statement from another manager saying “Of course, you know what people say
around here: zero tolerance. There’s no such thing as a second chance.”
Accountability. Accountability to an intra-organizational audience was manipulated
through (1) a description of the role and responsibilities of Chris Meyer, prior to reading the
various memos and (2) a statement regarding accountability that was embedded in one of the
memos. As part of the introduction describing their role as Chris Meyer, participants randomly
assigned to the high accountability condition read the following:
…as assistant manager, you should be aware that your fellow managers as well as
senior executives at JAKE’S corporate office will want to be informed of the decisions
you make and the actions you take. Thus, you should always be ready to justify these
decisions and actions when you are called upon to do so.
In addition, as part of the memo asking them to impose a punishment, participants in the
accountable condition will see the following comment made by Barbara Brown, the
administrative assistant: “Chris – I’m sure other managers and assistant managers will be
interested to see how you deal with this case and how you will justify your decision.”
On the other hand, participants assigned to the low accountability condition will not read any
such statements in either the description of their role as Chris Meyer or in the memos.

39

Severity of negative consequences. The severity of the negative consequences of the
ethical misconduct was manipulated through a statement made by Controller James Walters as
part of his assessment of the repercussions of Steve’s actions with respect to JAKE’S supplier
Jensen Marketing. Participants randomly assigned to the high severity condition read the
following statement embedded in Walters’ memo: “Unfortunately, based on my conversation
with Jensen’s representative, Steve’s actions seemed to have made them seriously doubt our
credibility as a business customer, which may likely result in more stringent and costly delivery
processes for us.” On the other hand, participants assigned to the low severity condition read the
statement: “Based on my conversation with Jensen’s representative, Steve’s actions did not seem
to have damaged our relationship with them in any way. I don’t think the incident has any other
serious or adverse consequences for JAKE’S as a company.”
Dependent Measures
I measured punitive intent by asking participants to consider an appropriate punishment
for Steve Atkins, as part of their response to a memo from JAKE’S controller, James Walters. I
operationalized punitive intent in response to ethical misconduct in two ways: as intention to
punish and as proposed sanction. In addition, I constructed three composite measures of punitive
intent based on these measures of intent to punish and proposed sanction.
Intention to punish. I measured participants’ intention to punish as the average of a
three-item scale, with which I asked participants to indicate, on a seven-point response format (1
= “strongly disagree,” 7 = “strongly agree”) the extent to which they agreed with each of the
following statements: “I intend to punish Steve severely,” “I plan to impose a stiff penalty on
Steve for his actions,” and “I am inclined to enforce serious negative sanctions on Steve.” This
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measure of intention to punish had a Cronbach’s Alpha of .94, with all items loading onto a
single factor.
Proposed sanction. In addition, I also asked participants to recommend an appropriate
sanction for Steve using a nine-point response format ranging from “no suspension” (coded as 1)
to “termination” (coded as 9). A sample memo with both punitive intent measures is shown as
Appendix B.
Composite measures of punitive intent. For purposes of conducting post-hoc analyses,
I constructed indexes or composite measures of punitive intent. Each of these composites is a
weighted average of the standardized scores obtained from the three items used to measure
intention to punish and the single item measuring proposed sanction. One composite, which I
refer to as Punitive Intent (A), was computed as the average of the standardized score on the
three-item intention to punish measure and the standardized score on proposed sanction. A
second, Punitive Intent (B), was computed as the average of four standardized scores: three
scores corresponding to each of the intention to punish items and the fourth corresponding to
proposed sanction. A third, Punitive Intent (C), was computed as the average of two
components: (i) the average of three standardized scores, corresponding to each of the items on
the intention to punish measure, and (ii) the standardized proposed sanction score. All three
composite measures were internally consistent (Cronbach’s Alpha values were .79, .92, and .79
for the three composites, respectively).
After completing the in-basket exercise and the other measures, I asked participants to
self-report demographic information such as age, sex, marital status, race/ethnicity, full time/part
time work status, number of hours they work each week, and tenure in their current company.
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Manipulation Checks
After participants finished the in-basket exercise, they completed a brief questionnaire
that contained the manipulation checks. All the manipulation check items were scored using a
seven-point response format (1 = “strongly disagree,” 7 = “strongly agree”).
Perceived organizational forgiveness. The effectiveness of the perceived
organizational forgiveness manipulation was assessed using a three-item scale asking
participants to rate the extent to which they thought that JAKE’S was a company were people
“are forgiving,” “dwell on past mistakes or bad decisions,” (reverse-scored) and “tend to harbor
grudges ” (reverse-scored). The three items all cleanly loaded onto a single factor, and had a
Cronbach’s Alpha of .85. These items were embedded within a scale that included five other
items that may be used to describe people in a company such as JAKE’S (see Appendix C).
Accountability. The effectiveness of the accountability manipulation was assessed with
the item “As assistant manager, I felt that I had to be able to justify my decisions and actions to
the other managers.”
Severity of negative consequences. Finally, the effectiveness of the severity of negative
consequences manipulation was assessed by asking participants to rate the extent to which they
felt that Steve Atkins’s action of taking home the espresso maker resulted in serious
repercussions for JAKE’S as a company. Two items were used for this manipulation check:
“Steve Atkins’ action of taking the espresso maker home has serious negative consequences for
JAKE’S” and “Steve Atkins’ action of taking the espresso maker home has grave repercussions
for JAKE’S as a company.” The two items were significantly correlated (r(173) = .58, p < .001)
and had an internal consistency of .73. Hence, they were averaged into an index.
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Results
Table 1 provides the means, standard deviations, and zero-order correlations. Intention to
punish was highly correlated with proposed sanction (r(173) = .65, p < .001). As expected, the
three composite measures were each highly correlated with intention to punish (minimum r(173) =
.90, p < .001), with proposed sanction (minimum r(173) = .80, p < .001), and with each other
(minimum r(173) = .97, p < .001).
Manipulation Checks
The manipulation checks were subjected to 2 x 2 x 2 analyses of variance (ANOVAs).
As expected, participants assigned to the high perceived organizational forgiveness condition
viewed JAKE’S as a more forgiving organization (M = 5.79, SE = 0.09) than did those assigned
to the low condition (M = 3.27, SE = 0.14), with F(1,165) = 216.60 (p < .001, partial η2 = 0.57). In
addition, participants assigned to the high accountability condition felt that they had to be able to
justify their decisions and action to other managers more than those who were assigned to the
low condition (M = 5.73, SE = 0.12 and M = 5.29, SE = 0.17, respectively; F(1,165) = 4.50, p < .05,
partial η2 = 0.03). Finally, as anticipated, participants assigned to the high severity of negative
consequences condition viewed Steve Atkins’ action as resulting in severe repercussions for
JAKE’S (M = 5.13, SE = 0.14) more than did those assigned to the low condition (M = 4.27, SE
= 0.16), with F(1,165) = 16.38, p < .001, partial η2 = 0.09. The manipulation checks indicate that
the experimental manipulations achieved their purpose. There were no statistically significant
“cross-over” effects of the two- and three-way interactions on any of these manipulation checks.
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Table 1 Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations
Variable
1. Perceived Organizational Forgiveness
(0 = Low, 1 = High)
2. Accountability (0 = Low, 1 = High)
3. Severity of Negative Consequences
(0 = Low, 1 = High)
4. Age
5. Sex (1 = Male, 2 = Female)
6. Intention to punish
7. Proposed sanction
8. Punitive Intent (A)
9. Punitive Intent (B)
10. Punitive Intent (C)

M
0.48

SD
0.50

1

2

0.51
0.52

0.50
0.50

-0.02
0.02

0.06

23.75
1.43
4.95
4.61
0.00
0.00
0.00

3.59
0.50
1.38
2.46
0.91
0.89
0.88

0.07
-0.12
-0.13
-0.20**
-0.18*
-0.16*
-0.18*

0.08
-0.06
-0.04
0.03
-0.01
-0.03
-0.01

N = 173. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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3

4

5

6

7

8

9

-0.13
-0.05
0.18*
0.11
0.16*
0.18*
0.16*

-0.08
0.06
-0.07
-0.01
0.03
-0.01

-0.08
0.04
-0.02
-0.05
-0.02

0.65***
0.91***
0.98***
0.90***

0.91***
0.80***
0.91***

0.98***
1.000***

0.97***

Analysis
I conducted a three-way multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) to examine the
effects of perceived organizational forgiveness, accountability, and severity of negative
consequences on the two dependent measures. The results of the MANOVA are presented as
Table 2. There was no evidence from Box’s test to suggest that the variance-covariance matrices
of both dependent variables were unequal across the eight cells generated by the 2 x 2 x 2 design
(Box’s M = 18.84, F(21, 88763.42) = 0.86, p = .64); therefore, I used Wilks’ Λ to evaluate the effects.
Table 2 Multivariate Analysis of Variance of Punitive Intent: Lab Study
Effect
Intercept
POrgForg
Acct
NegCons
POrgForg x Acct
POrgForg x NegCons
Acct x NegCons
POrgForg x Acct x NegCons

Wilks’ Λ

F(2,164)

p

partial η2

0.07
0.96
0.99
0.97
0.97
0.96
0.99
1.00

1180.53
3.42
0.56
2.81
2.68
3.84
0.47
0.08

.000
.035
.570
.063
.072
.023
.625
.925

0.94
0.04
0.01
0.03
0.03
0.05
0.01
0.00

Note. POrgForg = Perceived Organizational Forgiveness. Acct = Accountability.
NegCons = Severity of Negative Consequences

The MANOVA results indicate a statistically significant main effect of perceived
organizational forgiveness on the combined dependent measures of punitive intent (Wilks’ Λ =
0.96, F(2,164) = 3.42, p < .05) as well as a statistically significant interaction of perceived
organizational forgiveness and the severity of the negative consequences of the ethical
misconduct (Wilks’ Λ = 0.96, F(2,164) = 3.84, p < .05). As a follow up to these MANOVA
results, I conducted separate analyses of variance (ANOVAs) for intention to punish and for
proposed sanction. The results of the ANOVAs are presented as Table 3.
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Table 3 Univariate Analyses of Variance: Lab Study

Source
Intercept
POrgForg
Acct
NegCons
POrgForg x Acct
POrgForg x NegCons
Acct x NegCons
POrgForg x Acct x NegCons
Error
Total

df
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
165
173

DV = Intention to punish
MS
F
partial η2
4172.17
2328.79***
0.93
+
4.96
2.77
0.02
0.93
0.52
0.00
*
10.13
5.65
0.03
0.02
0.01
0.00
**
13.18
7.36
0.04
1.69
0.94
0.01
0.11
0.06
0.00
1.79

DV = Proposed sanction
MS
F
partial η2
3588.72 632.38***
0.79
**
39.02
6.88
0.04
0.13
0.02
0.00
12.43
2.19
0.01
16.94
2.99+
0.02
*
27.02
4.76
0.03
2.57
0.45
0.00
0.04
0.01
0.00
5.68

Note. POrgForg = Perceived Organizational Forgiveness. Acct = Accountability. NegCons = Severity of Negative Consequences.
+
p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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Evidence from the study was consistent with Hypotheses 1a and 1b. As expected, individuals
assigned to the high perceived organizational forgiveness condition reported the intention to
punish Steve less severely (M = 4.76, SE = 0.15) than did those assigned to the low perceived
organizational forgiveness condition (M = 5.10, SE = 0.14), although the effect of perceived
organizational forgiveness on intention to punish was marginally significant (F(1,165) = 2.77, p =
.098, partial η2 = 0.02). Hence, there was marginal support for Hypothesis 1a, as depicted in
Figure 3.

Figure 3 Main Effect of Perceived Organizational Forgiveness on Intention to Punish

On the other hand, the effect of perceived organizational forgiveness on proposed
sanction was statistically significant (F(1,165) = 6.88, p < .05, partial η 2 = 0.04), with the sanction
proposed by individuals assigned to the high perceived organizational forgiveness condition
being less severe, on average (M = 4.10, SE = 0.26), than the sanction proposed by those
assigned to the low condition (M = 5.05, SE = 0.25). Figure 4 depicts the effect of perceived
organizational forgiveness on proposed sanction.
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Figure 4 Main Effect of Perceived Organizational Forgiveness on Proposed Sanction
There was not sufficient evidence to support Hypotheses 2a and 2b. Based on a twotailed criterion, there was no statistically significant interactive effect of perceived organizational
forgiveness and accountability on both intention to punish (F(1,165) = 0.01, p = .91) and on
proposed sanction (F(1,165) = 2.99, p = .086). However, given that the pattern of the interaction
effect on proposed sanction was in the hypothesized direction, a one-tailed significance test
suggests that there was a statistically significant interaction effect on proposed sanction (F(1,165) =
2.99, p < .05, one-tailed; see Figure 5). Simple effects analysis revealed that perceived
organizational forgiveness had a statistically significant simple effect on proposed sanction when
accountability was high (simple effect F(1,87) = 9.03, p < .01), with participants assigned to the
high perceived organizational forgiveness condition proposing less severe sanctions (M = 3.82,
SE = 0.37) than did those who were assigned to the low perceived organizational forgiveness
condition (M = 5.40, SE = 0.35). This simple effect was not detected when accountability was
low (M = 4.39, SE = 0.37 for high POF and M = 4.71, SE = 0.36 for low POF, simple effect
F(1,82) = 0.39, p = .54).
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Figure 5 Interaction Effect of Perceived Organizational Forgiveness and Accountability on
Proposed Sanction
Lastly, there was a statistically significant interaction effect of perceived organizational
forgiveness and severity of negative consequences on both intention to punish (F(1,165) = 7.36, p <
.01, partial η2 = 0.04) and proposed sanction (F(1,165) = 4.76, p < .05, partial η2 = 0.03).
However, the interaction effect was not consistent with Hypotheses 3a and 3b. Simple effects
analyses revealed that perceived organizational forgiveness had the anticipated effect on punitive
intent only when the severity of the negative consequences of the ethical misconduct was high.
Specifically, when the severity of the negative consequences of Steve’s actions was high,
perceived organizational forgiveness had a simple effect on intention to punish (F(1,88) = 12.75, p
< .001), such that participants assigned to the high perceived organizational forgiveness
condition indicated less severe intentions to punish Steve (M = 4.74, SE = 0.18) than did those
who were assigned to the low perceived organizational forgiveness condition (M = 5.62, SE =
0.17). On the other hand, when the severity of the negative consequences of Steve’s actions was
low, the intention to punish reported by participants assigned to the high perceived organizational
forgiveness did not significantly differ from that reported by participants in the low condition (M
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= 4.58, SE = 0.20 and M = 4.81, SE = 0.22, respectively, simple effect F(1,83) = 0.50, p = .482; see
Figure 6).

Figure 6 Interaction effect of Perceived Organizational Forgiveness and Severity of Negative
Consequences on Intention to Punish
Similarly, perceived organizational forgiveness had a simple effect on proposed sanction
when the severity of the negative consequences was high (F(1,88) = 13.91, p < .001), with
participants assigned to the high perceived organizational forgiveness condition proposing less
severe sanctions (M = 3.96, SE = 0.35) than did those who were assigned to the low perceived
organizational forgiveness condition (M = 5.76, SE = 0.34). When the severity of the negative
consequences of Steve’s actions was low, the sanction proposed by participants assigned to the
high perceived organizational forgiveness did not significantly differ from that proposed by
participants in the low condition (M = 4.26, SE = 0.40 and M = 4.39, SE = 0.37, respectively,
simple effect F(1,83) = 0.06, p = .811). Figure 7 depicts this interaction.
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Figure 7 Interaction effect of Perceived Organizational Forgiveness and Severity of Negative
Consequences on Proposed Sanction
Post-hoc Analyses
As part of my follow-up analyses, I examined the hypothesized relationships by running
three separate univariate ANOVAs, corresponding to the three composite measures of punitive
intent. The results of these post-hoc analyses are summarized in Table 4.
Across all three composite measures, there was evidence of a main effect of perceived
organizational forgiveness, consistent with hypotheses 1a and 1b. There was also evidence of
the interaction effect of perceived organizational forgiveness and the severity of the negative
consequences on each of the three composites, consistent with the patterns detected when
intention to punish and proposed sanction were analyzed separately. However, there was no
evidence of the interaction effect of perceived organizational forgiveness and accountability.
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Table 4 Post-hoc Univariate Analyses of Variance of Composite Measures: Lab Study

Source

df

Intercept
POrgForg
Acct
NegCons
POrgForg x Acct
POrgForg x NegCons
Acct x NegCons
POrgForg x Acct x NegCons
Error
Total

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
165
173

DV = Punitive Intent (A)
MS
F
partial
η2
0.03
0.04
0.00
4.31
5.63*
0.03
0.08
0.10
0.00
*
3.49
4.57
0.03
0.61
0.80
0.01
5.62
7.35**
0.04
0.64
0.83
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.77

DV = Punitive Intent (B)
MS
F
partial
η2
0.03
0.03
0.00
3.19
4.30*
0.03
0.21
0.29
0.00
*
3.97
5.35
0.03
0.11
0.15
0.00
5.74
7.73**
0.05
0.70
0.94
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.00
0.74

DV = Punitive Intent (C)
MS
F
partial
η2
0.03
0.04
0.00
4.15
5.72*
0.03
0.07
0.09
0.00
*
3.26
4.50
0.03
0.61
0.84
0.36
5.29
7.30**
0.04
0.60
0.83
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.00

Note. POrgForg = Perceived Organizational Forgiveness. Acct = Accountability. NegCons = Severity of Negative Consequences.
*
p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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Discussion
This study examined the influence of perceived organizational forgiveness on a
disciplinary agent’s punitive intent in response to ethical misconduct. The results provided
support for this hypothesized effect, particularly when punitive intent was operationalized as
proposed sanction. The results suggest that in response to ethical misconduct, individuals who
view their organizational context as forgiving tend to propose less severe sanctions than those
who see their organization as unforgiving. There was also evidence of this main effect when
punitive intent was operationalized as intention to punish, although the effect became statistically
significant only when the consequences of the unethical behavior to the organization were
severe. In the concluding chapter, I discuss the implication of these findings to the use of
criterion variables in research on punishment decision-making.
Moreover, the results suggest the conditions that appear to attenuate the effect of
perceived organizational forgiveness on punitive intent. First, the data were consistent with
expectation that the effect would be greater when the disciplinary agent had high accountability
as opposed to low accountability. That the effect of perceived organizational forgiveness on
proposed sanction was only observed among agents who were assigned to the high
accountability condition suggests that having low accountability attenuated the effect. When
individuals were put in a situation of low accountability, in which they presumably felt less of a
need to justify their decisions to other organizational members, perceived organizational
forgiveness did not have an effect on their proposed sanction. One theoretical implication of this
finding is that defensive bolstering (Tetlock et al., 1989), which would have potentially amplified
the effect of perceived organizational forgiveness on punitive intent, is less likely to be the
mechanism underlying the influence of accountability on the relationship between perceived
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organizational forgiveness and punitive intent. Instead, the attenuating effect of low
accountability is consistent with what Kurzban, DeScioli, and O’Brien (2007) refer to as an
audience effect of moralistic punishment. This audience effect refers to the increase in
punishment imposed on another individual perceived to have committed a moral violation when
the disciplinary agent anticipates that her decision will be revealed to others (e.g., an
experimenter, an unknown third party).
In the context of this study, the condition of high accountability serves as a cue to the
disciplinary agent that some third party audience is present and will know of the punishment
decision. This cue apparently prompts the disciplinary agent to moralistically punish in
accordance with the audience’s expectations and preferences. The agent estimates these
preferences using her perceptions of organizational forgiveness. Consequently, the agent
imposes a severe punishment when the audience that will know of the decision is unforgiving
and signifies a less severe punishment when that audience is forgiving. Conversely, under low
accountability, operationalized as the condition in which there was no indication about the need
for the disciplinary agent to justify her decision, there was an absence of such a prompt or cue to
punish in accordance with the audience expectations. Hence, there was a nonsignificant effect of
perceived organizational forgiveness in this condition.
Second, whereas I proposed that severe negative consequences of the unethical behavior
would attenuate the effect of perceived organizational forgiveness on punitive intent, the data
suggest the opposite. The results showed the influence of perceived organizational forgiveness
on both intention to punish and proposed sanction only when the unethical conduct being
punished had severe negative consequences for the organization. When the unethical behavior
did not have serious negative implications for the organization, there was no effect of perceived
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organizational forgiveness. To the extent that disciplinary agents use their perceptions of
organizational forgiveness as a heuristic for making punishment decisions, this finding suggests
that disciplinary agents tend to rely more on relevant cues provided by the organizational context
(i.e., cues on forgiveness when the decision involves punishment) when the offense is more
serious than when it is less serious. Punishing an offense that produced serious damage to an
organization is a high-stakes decision, compared to punishing an offense that resulted in little
damage to an organization. In such high-stakes decision contexts, the desire for accuracy among
decision makers is heightened (e.g., Kahn & Baron, 1995). Thus, disciplinary agents seek out
more information and maximize the use of available information, including their perceptions of
organizational forgiveness, when punishing more serious offenses relative to when they punish
less serious offenses.
Although the factorial experimental design of Study 1 allows for testing the causal effects
of perceived organizational forgiveness and the moderating effects of accountability and the
severity of the negative consequences of the offense, one potential limitation of this study is its
external validity. To what extent do disciplinary agents’ perceptions of perceived organizational
forgiveness in their actual organizations influence their punishment decision making? This is the
main impetus for the field study presented in Chapter Three.
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CHAPTER THREE: FIELD STUDY
Purpose of the Study
Similar to Study 1, the purpose of this study is to examine the hypothesized negative
relationship between perceived organizational forgiveness and punitive intent in response to
ethical misconduct. In addition, this study also aims to investigate the moderating effects of a
disciplinary agent’s salient transgression experience and the presence of mitigating
circumstances surrounding the ethical misconduct. Through a field experiment in which I
measured perceived organizational forgiveness and manipulated both the participant’s salient
transgression experience and the presence of mitigating circumstances in a vignette depicting
ethical misconduct, I tested Propositions 1, 3, and 5, as indicated in Chapter One. Consistent
with the lab study and with experimental studies of punishment decision-making in social
psychology (e.g., Carlsmith et al., 2002), I again operationalized punitive intent in two ways: (i)
as a measure of intention to punish, and (ii) as a proposed sanction. Accordingly, I tested the
following pairs of hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1a: Perceived organizational forgiveness will be negatively related to
intentions to punish in response to ethical misconduct.
Hypothesis 1b: Perceived organizational forgiveness will be negatively related to
proposed sanctions in response to ethical misconduct.
Hypothesis 2a: A disciplinary agent’s salient transgression experience will moderate the
relationship between perceived organizational forgiveness and intention to punish, such
that perceived organizational forgiveness and intention to punish will be negatively
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related when the agent’s salient experience is one of being forgiven and unrelated when
the agent’s salient experience is one of being unforgiven.
Hypothesis 2b: A disciplinary agent’s salient transgression experience will moderate the
relationship between perceived organizational forgiveness and proposed sanction, such
that perceived organizational forgiveness and proposed sanction will be negatively
related when the agent’s salient experience is one of being forgiven and unrelated when
the agent’s salient experience is one of being unforgiven.
Hypothesis 3a: Evidence of mitigating circumstances will moderate the relationship
between perceived organizational forgiveness and intention to punish, such that the
negative relationship will be weaker when there is evidence of mitigating circumstances
than when there is none.
Hypothesis 3b: Evidence of mitigating circumstances will moderate the relationship
between perceived organizational forgiveness and proposed sanction, such that the
negative relationship will be weaker when there is evidence of mitigating circumstances
than when there is none.
A diagram of the hypotheses being tested is presented in Figure 8.

Figure 8 Model for Field Study
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Method
Sample and Design
Two hundred nineteen working undergraduate business students at a public university in
the southeastern United States voluntarily participated in this field study in which perceived
organizational forgiveness was measured, as opposed to manipulated. Participants were
randomly assigned to one of four conditions of the 2 (salient transgression experience:
unforgiven/forgiven) x 2 (mitigating circumstances: present/absent) factorial design. Fifty-two
participants (23.74%) did not respond substantively to the salient transgression experience
manipulation or failed to complete both dependent measures (e.g., did not write anything on the
space provided, or indicated that the situation was not applicable to them) and were excluded
from the final sample. All of the 167 participants in the final sample reported working at least 9
hours a week for an average of 28.82 hours a week (SD = 10.67), with the average company
tenure being 2.58 years (SD = 2.68). With the final sample, 38.3% reported that they were
working full-time. The average participant was 24.05 years old (SD = 4.15). Approximately
43.7% were female and 61.1% were non-Hispanic Caucasian (18.0% self-identified as Hispanic,
9.0% as Asian, and 7.2% as Black).
Procedure
After reading a cover letter providing them an overview of the study and their researchrelated rights, participants were asked to complete several tasks as part of the field survey. I
asked them to recall and summarize a work-related experience in which they were either
forgiven or not forgiven for a transgression they had committed. I then provided them a context
within which they were to indicate their punitive intent in response to ethical misconduct.
Specifically, I asked them to read the following vignette, in response to which they would have
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to signify their punitive intent. I patterned the vignette after that embedded in the lab study inbasket, based on a scenario developed by McMahon and Harvey (2006):
Imagine that you are a manager of your current work organization. Working for
you is Steve Atkins, an administrative assistant in charge of ordering equipment
and supplies. Based on credible information that you gathered from other
employees, Steve discovered an espresso maker in a delivery he received around
three months ago. Your company did not order the espresso maker, and it did not
appear on the invoice. Steve took it home without informing the supplier and the
delivery person about it, and has since sold it online. 1
Finally, I asked the participants to complete other measures, including a scale measuring
perceived organizational forgiveness. As with the lab study, I offered participants the
opportunity to be debriefed regarding the purpose and nature of the study, after all participants
had completed the survey.
Experimental Manipulations
Salient transgression experience. The experience of being unforgiven (versus forgiven)
was manipulated through an incident-recall exercise typical of the methodological paradigm used
to study transgression-specific forgiveness and forgiveness interventions (McCullough &
Worthington, 1999). Participants randomly assigned to the [un]forgiven condition read the
following instructions, with elements adapted from similar recall exercises (e.g., Baumeister,
Stillwell, & Wotman, 1990; Freedman & Enright, 1996; McCullough, Worthington, & Rachal,
1997; Miller, 1992; Zechmeister & Romero, 2002):

1

Based on a pilot test that included individuals working full-time in non-restaurant settings (N = 24), there was no
evidence that an espresso maker was inappropriate for a vignette.
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Nearly everyone has, at some point, treated a co-worker, subordinate, or boss in
such a way that may have hurt or offended them. It may have been unintentional or
intentional. But it may have led to a sense of injustice, of being hurt, or a betrayal of trust
on the part of the other person. Spend a few moments to recall a work-related incident in
which you were [not] forgiven by someone whom you may have hurt or offended.
Visualize in your mind what that person said in deciding [not] to forgive you, and how
you felt during that moment. In the spaces provided below, write a 3-5 sentence
summary of the incident. Whenever possible, describe your experience in detail, but feel
free to withhold identifying information (e.g., names, places, company, dates) in writing
your summary.
Mitigating circumstances. The existence of mitigating circumstances surrounding Steve
Atkins’ ethical misconduct was manipulated by providing additional information regarding his
reasons for taking home the espresso maker and selling it online. In the condition in which
evidence of mitigating circumstances was present, participants read the following additional
sentences:
When you talked with Steve about his actions, he explained that he took the
espresso maker and sold it online because he needed the money to pay for the medical
bills of his wife, who is sick of cancer. You have verified from other employees that
indeed, he was having a hard time making ends meet since his wife got sick.
On the other hand, participants assigned to the condition in which evidence of mitigating
circumstances was absent read the following information:
When you talked with Steve about his actions, he explained that he took the
espresso maker and sold it online because he needed the money to pay for his credit card
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bills. You have verified from other employees that indeed, he was having a hard time
making ends meet because of his credit card debt.
Independent Variables and Potential Covariates
Perceived organizational forgiveness. To assess the participant’s perceived
organizational forgiveness of his or her current workplace, I used the three-item measure of
organizational forgiveness developed by Cameron et al. (2004). On a seven-point response
format (1 = “to a small extent,” 7 = “to a large extent”), I asked participants to rate the extent to
which they think the following statements are true of their current work organization: “We try to
learn from our mistakes here; consequently, missteps are quickly forgiven,” “This is a forgiving,
compassionate organization in which to work,” and “We have very high standards of
performance, yet we forgive mistakes when they are acknowledged and corrected.” Based on a
principal components analysis, all three items loaded on a single factor and had a Cronbach’s
Alpha of .79.
Social desirability. As a potential covariate, I measured each participant’s propensity to
respond in socially desirable ways initially using revised Form X1, a seven-item subset of
Crowne and Marlowe’s (1960) Social Desirability Scale that Fischer and Fick (1993, p. 423)
described as one of the two subscales that was “superior to all of the other scales,” having
“acceptable internal consistency.” The seven items loaded onto two factors, based on a principal
components analysis. Three items loaded onto a single factor but had extremely low internal
consistency (Cronbach’s Alpha = .39). The other four-item subset, which consisted of items that
were all reverse-scored, cleanly loaded onto a second factor, with a modest internal consistency
of .62. I used the average rating from these four items (“I sometimes feel resentful when I don’t
get my way,” “There are times when I felt like rebelling against people in authority even though
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I knew they were right,” “There have been times when I was quite jealous of the good fortune of
others,” and “I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favors of me”) as a measure of social
desirability. The items used a five-point response format (1 = “to a small extent,” 5 = “to a large
extent”).
Perceived Unethicality of Steve’s Actions. As a covariate potentially useful for a posthoc analysis of the mechanisms underlying the relationship between perceived organizational
forgiveness and punitive intent, I also assessed the participants’ ethical tolerance by measuring
their perceptions of the extent to which Steve’s actions were unethical. After participants had
read the vignette and before they indicated their intention to punish and their proposed sanction, I
asked them to rate on a seven-point response format (1 = “to a small extent,” 7 = “to a large
extent”), the extent to which they agreed with following statements: “What Steve did was a
major breach of ethical standards,” and “Steve’s actions constitute grave misconduct.” Because
the two items were highly correlated (r = .69, p < .001), I took their average as a measure of
perceived unethicality of Steve’s actions. Cronbach’s Alpha for this two-item measure was .82.
Tendency to Forgive. As another potential covariate that may account for variance in
punishment intentions, I also assessed the participants’ dispositional tendency to forgive. I
measured this tendency to forgive using Brown’s four-item (2003) scale, with which participants
rated on a seven-point response format (1 = “almost always false of me,” 7 = “almost always true
of me”) the extent to which thought statements about forgiving were true of themselves. Sample
items were “I tend to get over it quickly when someone hurts my feelings” and “I have a
tendency to harbor grudges” (reverse-scored). Cronbach’s Alpha for this four-item measure was
.69.
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Demographic variables. After completing the in-basket and other measures, I asked
participants to self-report demographic information such as age, sex, marital status,
race/ethnicity, full time/part time work status, number of hours they work each week, and tenure
in their current company.
Dependent Measures
I measured punitive intent by asking participants to consider an appropriate punishment
for Steve Atkins. As I did with the lab study, I operationalized punitive intent in response to a
transgression in two ways: as intention to punish and as proposed sanction. As I did in the lab
study, I constructed three composite measures or indexes of punitive intent based on these
measures of intent to punish and proposed sanction, for purposes of conducting post-hoc
analyses.
Intention to punish. I measured participants’ intention to punish as the average of a
three-item scale, with which I asked them to indicate, on a seven-point response format (1 =
“strongly disagree,” 7 = “strongly agree”) the extent to which they agreed with each of the
following statements: “If I were Steve’s manager, I would punish him severely,” “If I were
Steve’s manager, I would impose a stiff penalty on him for his actions,” and “If Steve were my
subordinate, I would enforce serious negative sanctions on him.” This measure of intention to
punish had a Cronbach’s Alpha of .88, with all items loading onto a single factor.
Proposed sanction. In addition, I asked participants to recommend an appropriate
sanction for Steve using a nine-point response format ranging from “no suspension” (coded as 1)
to “termination” (coded as 9).
Composite measures of punitive intent. Analogous to what I did in the lab study, I
created three composite measures of punitive intent as weighted averages of the standardized
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scores obtained from the three items used to measure intention to punish and the single item
measuring proposed sanction. The first, Punitive Intent (A), was computed as the average of the
standardized score on the three-item intention to punish measure and the standardized score on
proposed sanction. Punitive Intent (B), the second, was computed as the average of four
standardized scores: three scores corresponding to each of the intention to punish items and the
fourth corresponding to proposed sanction. The third, Punitive Intent (C), was computed as the
average of two components: (i) the average of three standardized scores, corresponding to each
of the items on the intention to punish measure, and (ii) the standardized proposed sanction
score. All three composite measures were internally consistent (Cronbach’s Alpha values were
.73, .87, and .74 for the three composites, respectively).
Manipulation Checks
Salient transgression experience. The effectiveness of the salient transgression
experience manipulation was assessed by asking participants to rate the extent to which the word
“unforgiven” describes them at that moment, using a five-point response format (1 = “very
slightly or not at all,” 5 = “extremely”). This single-item manipulation check was embedded
within the twenty-item Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, &
Tellegen, 1988) and was administered immediately following the incident-recall manipulation.
Mitigating circumstances. To assess the effectiveness of the mitigating circumstances
manipulation, I asked participants to rate the extent to which they felt that there were
circumstances that attenuated Steve Atkins’ responsibility for what he did, using a seven-point
response format (1 = “strongly disagree,” 7 = “strongly agree”). Two items were used for this
manipulation check: “There are aspects of Steve’s circumstances that make him less
blameworthy for his actions” and “The reason Steve gave for taking the espresso maker and
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selling it online makes him less culpable for his actions.” The two items were significantly
correlated, r(167) = .43, p< .001 and had an internal consistency of .61. Given that both sentences
were stated in terms of less responsibility on the part of Steve, higher average scores on these
two items reflect perceptions of a lower degree of culpability on Steve’s part.
Results
Table 5 provides the means, standard deviations, and zero-order correlations. As with
Study 1, intention to punish was highly correlated with proposed sanction (r(167) = .58, p < .001).
Age was significantly correlated with both intention to punish (r(167) = .20, p < .01) and proposed
sanction (r(167) = .24, p < .01). Sex was significantly correlated with proposed sanction (r(167) =
.16, p < .05), with women proposing more severe sanctions than men (M = 4.64, SE = 0.34 and
M = 3.80, SE = 0.24, respectively, with t165 = 2.08, p < .05). As expected, the three composite
measures were each also highly correlated with intention to punish (minimum r(167) = .88, p <
.001), with proposed sanction (minimum r(167) = .76, p < .001), and with each other (minimum
r(173) = .97, p < .001). Social desirability was not significantly correlated with any of the
dependent measures with the exception of Punitive Intent (A) (r(167) = .16, p < .05).
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Table 5 Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations: Field Study Variables
Variable
1. Perceived Organizational Forgiveness
2. Salient transgression experience
(-1 = Forgiven, 1 = Unforgiven)
3. Mitigating Circumstances
(-1 = Absent, 1 = Present)
4. Age
5. Sex (1 = male, 2 = female)
6. Social Desirability
7. Intention to punish
8. Proposed Sanction
9. Punitive Intent (A)
10. Punitive Intent (B)
11. Punitive Intent (C)
12. Perceived Unethicality of Offense
13. Tendency to Forgive
*

**

N = 167. p < .05. p < .01.

M
5.21

SD
1.23

1

-0.01

1.00

-0.08

0.01
24.03
1.44
3.43
4.75
4.17
0.00
0.01
0.00
5.75
4.14

1.00
4.15
0.50
0.75
1.54
2.64
0.89
0.85
0.85
1.31
1.16

-0.02
0.00
0.09
-0.05
0.10
0.05
0.09
0.10
0.09
0.12
0.08

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

-0.04
0.08
0.07
-0.01
0.03
0.01
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.02
-0.03

0.02
0.03
0.03
-0.39***
-0.17*
-0.32***
-0.37***
-0.32***
-0.30***
-0.10

0.08
0.07
0.20**
0.24**
0.25**
0.23**
0.25**
0.15
0.01

0.14
0.06
0.16*
0.12
0.10
0.13
0.18*
-0.09

0.14
0.14
0.16*
0.15
0.15
0.15
0.37***

0.58***
0.89***
0.97***
0.88***
0.71***
0.08

0.89***
0.76***
0.90***
0.44***
0.01

0.97***
1.00***
0.65***
0.05

0.97***
0.70***
0.07

0.64***
0.05

0.07

***

p < .001.
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Manipulation Checks
The manipulation checks were subjected to 2 x 2 analyses of covariance (ANCOVAs) in
order to control for the positive correlation between age and the manipulation check for the
salient transgression experience (r = .16, p < .05) and for the possible spillover effect of one
manipulation on the manipulation check measure of the other variable. As expected, participants
assigned to the unforgiven experience condition reported feeling more unforgiven (M = 1.63, SE
= 0.11) than did those assigned to the forgiven condition (M = 1.35, SE = 0.09), with F(1,161) =
3.55 (one-tailed p = .03, partial η2 = 0.02). In addition, participants assigned to the mitigating
circumstances present condition saw Steve Atkins as less culpable or blameworthy for his
actions (M = 3.60, SE = 0.16) than did those assigned to the absent condition (M = 2.34, SE =
0.13), with F(1,163) = 36.72, p < .001, partial η2 = 0.19. There were no statistically significant
cross-over effects of the two-way interaction between salient experience and mitigating
circumstances on any of these manipulation checks.
Analysis
I conducted two separate moderated multiple regressions to examine the effects of
perceived organizational forgiveness, salient transgression experience, and mitigating
circumstances on each of the dependent measures. Because cumulative empirical evidence
suggests that age and sex predict ethical cognition (e.g., Borkowski & Ugras, 1998; O’Fallon and
Butterfield, 2005), I included age and sex as controls in regression analyses whenever they
systematically accounted for significant variation in each of the dependent measures. Thus,
because age was significantly correlated with both intention to punish and proposed sanction, I
included age as a control in both regression analyses. Moreover, given that sex was significantly
correlated with proposed sanction, I included it as a control variable in the regression analysis of
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proposed sanction. In addition, I mean-centered perceived organizational forgiveness and
centered the dichotomous independent variables, salient transgression experience and mitigating
circumstances, around zero.
I entered the relevant control variables in the regression equation in step 1. Perceived
organizational forgiveness, salient transgression experience, and mitigating circumstances were
then entered as predictor variables in step 2. Two-way and three-way interaction terms were
then entered as predictors in steps 3 and 4. Although I did not hypothesize a three-way
interaction among the independent variables, I included a three-way interaction term in the final
regression models because

Table 6 shows the moderated multiple regression results for both

intention to punish and proposed sanction.
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Table 6 Moderated Multiple Regression Analyses: Field Study

DV = Intention to Punish
Step 2
Step 3

Step 1
Predictors
Age

Step 4

Step 4

b
(SE b)

β

b
(SE b)

β

b
(SE b)

β

b
(SE b)

β

b
(SE b)

β

b
(SE b)

β

b
(SE b)

β

b
(SE b)

β

0.08
(0.03)

0.20**

0.08
(0.03)

0.21**

0.07
(0.03)

0.19**

0.06
(0.03)

0.16*

0.14
(0.05)
0.75
(0.40)

0.22**

0.15
(0.05)
0.77
(0.40)
0.07
(0.16)
-0.06
(0.20)
-0.48
(0.20)

0.23**

0.14
(0.05)
0.92
(0.40)
0.05
(0.16)
-0.06
(0.20)
-0.46
(0.19)
0.39
(0.16)

0.21**

0.13
(0.05)
0.93
(0.40)
0.07
(0.16)
-0.05
(0.20)
-0.45
(0.19)
0.36
(0.16)

0.20*

Sex
0.11
(0.09)
0.01
(0.11)
-0.60
(0.11)

POrgForg
SalientExp
Mit
POrgForg x
SalientExp
POrgForg x
Mit
SalientExp
x Mit
POrgForg x
SalientExp
x Mit
F
Adj R2
ΔR2

DV = Proposed Sanction
Step 2
Step 3

Step 1

6.90**
0.03
0.04**

0.09
0.01
-0.39***

10.30***
0.18
0.16***

0.10
(0.09)
0.01
(0.11)
-0.58
(0.11)
0.27
(0.09)

0.08
0.01
-0.38***
0.22**

0.13
(0.09)
0.02
(0.10)
-0.56
(0.10)
0.24
(0.09)

0.14

0.11
0.02
-0.37***

0.15
0.04
-0.02
-0.18*

0.19**

0.17*
0.02
-0.02
-0.18*
0.18*

0.18*
0.03
-0.02
-0.17*
0.17*

0.00
(0.10)

0.00

-0.02
(0.09)

-0.02

0.05
(0.16)

0.03

0.04
(0.16)

0.02

0.07
(0.11)

0.04

0.07
(0.10)

0.04

0.20
(0.20)

0.08

0.21
(0.20)

0.08

0.22
(0.09)

0.18*

0.16
(0.17)

0.07

7.62***
0.22
0.05*

7.66***
0.24
0.03*

6.65**
0.06
0.08**

3.98**
0.08
0.04

Note. POrgForg = Perceived Organizational Forgiveness. SalientExp = Salient Transgression Experience. Mit = Mitigating Circumstances.
*
p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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3.37**
0.10
0.04

3.09**
0.10
0.01

There was a non-significant positive relationship between perceived organizational
forgiveness and intention to punish (r(167) = .10, p = .20; β = .11, p = .13). Thus, hypothesis 1a
was not supported. There was also a non-significant positive relationship between perceived
organizational forgiveness and proposed sanction (r(167) = .05, p = .49; β = .03, p = .68). Thus,
hypothesis 1b was not supported.
To determine whether evidence from the study was consistent with Hypothesis 2a, I
examined the statistically significant effect of the interaction of perceived organizational
forgiveness and salient transgression experience on intention to punish (β = .19, t = 2.72, p < .01)
in light of the significant three-way interaction with mitigating circumstances (β = .18, p < .05; Δ
R2 = .03, ΔF(1,158) = 6.13, p < .05; cf. Aiken & West, 1991). Perceived organizational
forgiveness and salient transgression experience did have a significant interaction effect on
intention to punish for participants assigned to the present mitigating circumstances condition (β
= .37, t = 3.57, p < .01; see Figure 9), but not for those assigned to the absent mitigating
circumstances condition (β = .01, t = 0.11, p = .91; see Figure 10). Consistent with hypothesis
2a, there was a statistically significant negative relationship between perceived organizational
forgiveness and intention to punish (simple slope = -0.38, t = -2.47, p < .05) among participants
assigned to the forgiven salient transgression experience condition. However, contrary to
hypothesis 2a, there was also evidence of a statistically significant positive relationship between
perceived organizational forgiveness and intention to punish (simple slope = 0.63, t = 3.83, p <
.001) among participants for whom an unforgiven transgression experience was salient. Thus,
hypothesis 2a was partly supported.
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Figure 9 Interaction Effect of Perceived Organizational Forgiveness and Salient Transgression
Experience on Intention to Punish (Mitigating Circumstances Present Condition

Figure 10 Interaction Effect of Perceived Organizational Forgiveness and Salient Transgression
Experience on Intention to Punish (Mitigating Circumstances Absent Condition

There was no three-way interaction among perceived organizational forgiveness, salient
transgression experience, and mitigating circumstances, when the dependent measure was
proposed sanction. Nevertheless, there was an observed interaction effect of perceived
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organizational forgiveness and salient transgression experience on proposed sanction (β = .17, t =
2.20, p < .05; see Figure 11). Consistent with hypothesis 2b, there was a negative, albeit nonsignificant, relationship between perceived organizational forgiveness and proposed sanction
among participants assigned to recall a transgression experience in which they were forgiven
(simple slope = -0.28, t = -1.14, p = .26). However, contrary to hypothesis 2b, there was
evidence of a statistically significant positive relationship between perceived organizational
forgiveness and proposed sanction among participants for whom an unforgiven transgression
experience was salient (simple slope = 0.47, t = 2.06, p < .05). Thus, hypothesis 2b was not
supported.

Figure 11 Interaction Effect of Perceived Organizational Forgiveness and Salient Transgression
Experience on Proposed Sanction
Finally, although there was a main effect of mitigating circumstances on intention to
punish (β = -.37, t = -5.41, p < .001) such that participants who read that Steve’ Atkins needed to
pay for his wife’s medical bills indicated less severe punishment intentions than those who read
that Steve did what he did to pay for his credit cards (M = 4.15, SE = 0.17 and M = 5.34, SE =
0.13, respectively), the interaction between perceived organizational forgiveness and mitigating
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circumstances was not statistically significant (β = -.01, t = -0.21, p = .84). Thus, hypothesis 3a
was not supported. Analogously, although participants who read the vignette with mitigating
circumstances present tended to propose a significantly less severe sanction than those who read
the version where mitigating circumstances were absent (M = 3.71, SE = 0.28 and M = 4.63, SE
= 0.29, respectively; β = -.17, t = -2.31, p < .05), there was no statistically significant interaction
effect of perceived organizational forgiveness and mitigating circumstances on proposed
sanction (β = .02, t = 0.25, p = .81). Hypothesis 3b was not supported.
Post-hoc Analysis
As part of my follow-up analyses, I examined the hypothesized relationships by running
three separate moderated multiple regressions, corresponding to the three composite measures of
punitive intent. The results of these post-hoc analyses are summarized in Tables 7 and 8.
Across all three composite measures, the pattern of effects was consistent with those
detected when intention to punish and proposed sanction were analyzed separately. There was a
main effect of mitigating circumstances and an interaction effect of perceived organizational
forgiveness and salient transgression experience on each of the composite measures. The effect
of the three-way interaction among the predictors was significant only for Punitive Intent (B).
Given that this was the composite measure with which the intention to punish items received an
aggregate weighting three times that of the proposed sanction item, this finding is not surprising
and is consistent with the three-way interaction discussed earlier.
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Table 7 Post-hoc Moderated Multiple Regression Analyses: Field Study
DV = Punitive Intent (A)
Step 2
Step 3

Step 1
Predictors
Age
Social
Desirability
POrgForg

DV = Punitive Intent (B)
Step 2
Step 3

Step 1

Step 4

b
(SE b)

β

b
(SE b)

β

b
(SE b)

β

b
(SE b)

β

b
(SE b)

β

b
(SE b)

β

b
(SE b)

β

b
(SE b)

β

0.05
(0.02)
0.17
(0.09)

0.24**

0.05
(0.02)
0.19
(0.09)

0.24**

0.05
(0.02)
0.17
(0.08)

0.23**

0.04
(0.02)
0.16
(0.08)

0.20**

0.05
(0.02)

0.23**

0.05
(0.01)

0.24**

0.05
(0.01)

0.23**

0.04
(0.01)

0.19**

0.06
(0.05)
-0.00
(0.06)
-0.29
(0.06)

0.09

0.06
(0.05)
-0.00
(0.06)
-0.28
(0.06)
0.15
(0.05)

0.08

0.07
(0.05)
0.00
(0.06)
-0.27
(0.06)
0.13
(0.05)

0.09

0.06
(0.05)
-0.01
(0.06)
-0.32
(0.06)

0.09

0.06
(0.05)
-0.01
(0.06)
-0.31
(0.06)
0.15
(0.05)

0.08

0.07
(0.05)
-0.00
(0.06)
-0.30
(0.06)
0.13
(0.05)

0.11

0.14

SalientExp
Mit
POrgForg x
SalientExp
POrgForg x
Mit
SalientExp
x Mit
POrgForg x
SalientExp
x Mit
F
Adj R2
ΔR2

Step 4

7.13**
0.07
0.08**

0.15*

-0.01
-0.32***

7.61***
0.17
0.11***

0.15*

-0.00
-0.31***
0.20**

0.14

0.00
-0.30***

-0.01
-0.38***

0.18*

-0.01
-0.37***
0.21**

-0.00
-0.35***
0.18**

-0.00
(0.05)

0.00

-0.01
(0.05)

-0.01

0.00
(0.05)

0.00

-0.01
(0.05)

-0.01

0.06
(0.06)

0.06

0.06
(0.06)

0.06

0.05
(0.06)

0.06

0.05
(0.06)

0.06

0.09
(0.05)

0.13

0.12
(0.05)

0.17*

6.02***
0.20
0.04*

5.74***
0.21
0.01

9.38**
0.05
0.05**

10.34***
0.19
0.15***

Note. POrgForg = Perceived Organizational Forgiveness. SalientExp = Salient Transgression Experience. Mit = Mitigating Circumstances.
*
p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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7.59***
0.22
0.05*

7.52***
0.24
0.03*

Table 8 Additional Post-hoc Moderated Multiple Regression Analysis: Field Study
DV = Punitive Intent (C)
Step 2
Step 3

Step 1
Predictors
Age

β

b
(SE b)

β

b
(SE b)

β

b
(SE b)

β

0.05
(0.02)

0.25**

0.05
(0.02)

0.26**

0.05
(0.01)

0.24**

0.04
(0.02)

0.21**

0.06
(0.05)
-0.01
(0.06)
-0.27
(0.06)

0.08

0.05
(0.05)
-0.01
(0.06)
-0.26
(0.06)
0.14
(0.05)

0.07

0.06
(0.05)
-0.00
(0.06)
-0.26
(0.06)
0.12
(0.05)

0.09

Social
Desirability
POrgForg
SalientExp
Mit

-0.02
-0.32***

POrgForg x
SalientExp
POrgForg x
Mit
SalientExp
x Mit
POrgForg x
SalientExp
x Mit
F
Adj R2
ΔR2

Step 4

b
(SE b)

10.69**
0.06
0.06**

8.32***
0.15
0.11***

-0.01
-0.31***
0.20**

-0.01
-0.30***
0.18*

0.01
(0.05)

0.01

0.01
(0.05)

0.00

0.06
(0.06)

0.07

0.06
(0.06)

0.07

0.10
(0.05)

0.14

6.17***
0.18
0.04*

5.94***
0.19
0.02

Note. POrgForg = Perceived Organizational Forgiveness. SalientExp = Salient Transgression
Experience. Mit = Mitigating Circumstances.
*
p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

To explore the potential mechanisms underlying the effect of the interaction between
perceived organizational forgiveness and salient transgression experience on punitive intent, I
first examined the relationships between these predictors and the affective states of guilt and
anger (i.e., hostility), which the participants self-reported when they completed the PANAS as
part of the manipulation check. Neither guilt nor anger was correlated with perceived
organizational forgiveness, salient transgression experience, or the interaction between the two
predictors.
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Next, I examined how a disciplinary agent’s ethical tolerance, operationalized as the
agent’s perception of the unethicality of Steve’s offense, serves as a mechanism explaining the
interaction effect of perceived organizational forgiveness and salient transgression experience on
punitive intent. Among those assigned to the mitigating circumstances present condition, I found
the correlation between the interaction of perceived organizational forgiveness and salient
transgression experience (i.e., the product term) and perception of unethicality of Steve’s offense
to be statistically significant (r(85) = .36, p < .01). In addition, the correlations between this
perception of unethicality and each of the dependent measures were also statistically significant.
The correlation between perceived unethicality and intention to punish was r(85) = .67 (p < .001)
and the correlation between perceived unethicality and proposed sanction was r(85) = .47 (p <
.001). Given these relationships, I conducted a mediated moderation analysis using methods
suggested by Edwards and Lambert (2007). Because the correlation between the interaction of
perceived organizational forgiveness and salient transgression experience and the disciplinary
agent’s perceptions of unethicality of Steve’s actions was not statistically significant among
participants assigned to the mitigating circumstances absent condition (r(83) = .05, p = .69), I
confined my post-hoc mediated moderation analysis of intention to punish to those assigned to
the mitigating circumstances present condition.
The results of the mediated moderation analyses for intention to punish are summarized
in Table 9, with the simple effects at each of the levels of the salient transgression experience
(unforgiven vs. forgiven) indicated in Table 10.
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Table 9 Mediated Moderation Regression Analyses: DV = Intention to Punish
DV = Perceived
Unethicality
Model 1 Model 2

Predictor
Age
Sex
POrgForg
SalientExp
POrgForg x SalientExp
Perceived Unethicality

0.10
-0.02
0.41***

Adj R2
F

0.11
4.41**

0.88**
0.04
-0.02
0.46***

0.19
5.84***

DV = Intention to
Punish
Model 3 Model 4
0.06
0.03

0.03

0.73***

0.70***

0.44
34.26***

0.46
24.72***

N = 85, corresponding to participants assigned to the Mitigating Circumstances present
condition. Numbers are unstandardized regression coefficients.
*
p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Table 10 Mediated Moderation Regression Simple Effects: DV = Intention to Punish

Salient
Transgression
Experience
Unforgiven
Forgiven

Stage
First
0.51**
-0.32*

Second
0.73**
0.73**

Direct
0.03
0.03

Effect
Indirect
0.37**
-0.23*

Total
0.41**
-0.20

N = 85, corresponding to participants assigned to the Mitigating Circumstances present condition. Effects
were computed based on unstandardized regression coefficients.
*
p < .05. **p < .01

Consistent with the moderated multiple regression analysis of intention to punish, perceived
organizational forgiveness and salient transgression experience exhibited a statistically
significant interaction effect on the disciplinary agent’s perception of the unethicality of Steve’s
action (b = 0.41, p < .001, Model 1) when mitigating circumstances surrounding Steve Atkins’
action were present. This was true even controlling for the effect of sex on perceived
unethicality (b = 0.46, p < .001, Model 2). The simple effects analysis summarized in Table 10
suggest that when an experience of being unforgiven in the workplace was salient to the
disciplinary agent, perceived organizational forgiveness and perceptions of the unethicality of
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Steve’s action were positively related (simple effect = 0.51, p < .01). On the other hand, they
were negatively related when an experience of being forgiven was the one that was salient to the
agent (simple effect = -0.32, p < .05). In turn, the higher the perceived unethicality of Steve’s
action, the more severe the agent’s intention to punish (simple effect = 0.73, p.< .001, Model 3).
The indirect effect of perceived organizational forgiveness on intention to punish, mediated by
the agent’s perceived unethicality of Steve’s action, was positive when the experience salient to
the agent was one of being unforgiven (indirect effect = 0.37, p < .01). It was negative when the
salient experience was one of being forgiven (indirect effect = -0.23, p < .05). Figure 12
illustrates these mediated relationships for the unforgiven and the forgiven groups.

Figure 12 Mediated Models Showing Simple Effects for Unforgiven (Panel A) and Forgiven
(Panel B) Participants (DV = Intention to Punish)

There was evidence of a similar mediated moderation pattern when punitive intent was
operationalized as proposed sanction. Table 11 summarizes the results. Table 12 shows the
corresponding simple effects at each of the levels of the salient transgression experience
(unforgiven vs. forgiven).
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Table 11 Mediated Moderation Regression Analyses: DV = Proposed Sanction
DV = Perceived
Unethicality
Model 1 Model 2

Predictor
Age
Sex
POrgForg
SalientExp
POrgForg x SalientExp
Perceived Unethicality

0.12
0.04
0.26**

Adj R2
F

0.06
4.33**

0.53**
0.09
0.03
0.29***

0.09
5.15**

DV = Proposed
Sanction
Model 3 Model 4
0.11***
0.40
0.00
-0.00
0.88***

0.81***

0.18
19.66***

0.21
11.96**

N = 167. Numbers are unstandardized regression coefficients. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Table 12 Mediated Moderation Regression Simple Effects: DV = Proposed Sanction

Salient
Transgression
Experience
Unforgiven
Forgiven

Stage
First
0.38**
-0.14

Second
0.88**
0.88**

Direct
0.00
0.00

Effect
Indirect
0.33**
-0.12

Total
0.33*
-0.12

N = 167. Effects were computed based on unstandardized regression coefficients. *p < .05. **p < .01.

Perceived organizational forgiveness and salient transgression experience exhibited a statistically
significant effect on the disciplinary agent’s perception of the unethicality of Steve’s action (b =
0.26, p < .01), which, in turn, was positively related to the severity of the sanction proposed by
the agent (b = 0.88, p < .001). This time, the indirect effect of the interaction of perceived
organizational forgiveness and salient transgression experience on proposed sanction, mediated
by the agent’s perceived unethicality of Steve’s action, was statistically significant when the
experience salient to the agent was one of being unforgiven (indirect effect = 0.33, p < .01) but
nonsignificant when the salient experience was one of being forgiven (indirect effect = -0.12,
n.s.). Figure 13 illustrates these mediated relationships for the unforgiven and the forgiven
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groups.

Figure 13 Mediated Models Showing Simple Effects for Unforgiven (Panel A) and Forgiven
(Panel B) participants (DV = Proposed Sanction)
Discussion
The purpose of this study was to examine the relationship between perceived
organizational forgiveness and punitive intent, drawing on participants’ perceptions of and
experience of forgiveness in actual organizational settings. There was no evidence of the
hypothesized main effect of perceived organizational forgiveness on punitive intent,
operationalized either as intention to punish or proposed sanction. That said, the results of the
study suggest the conditions under which perceived organizational forgiveness is related (or
unrelated) to punishment intentions.
First, there was evidence of the hypothesized negative relationship between perceived
organizational forgiveness and the measure of intention to punish. More importantly, that
relationship was evident when the transgression experience salient to the disciplinary agent was
one in which she herself was forgiven and when there were mitigating circumstances
surrounding the transgressor’s unethical behavior. When mitigating circumstances regarding the
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unethical behavior were absent, perceived organizational forgiveness and intention to punish
were not related. The observed main effect of mitigating circumstances suggests that
participants who had no information that would mitigate an offender’s responsibility for an
unethical act tended to indicate higher levels of punitive intent than those who are made aware of
mitigating circumstances.
One way of interpreting these results, taken together, is that perceived organizational
forgiveness serves as a heuristic that anchors intentions to punish only when the disciplinary
agent has experienced being forgiven and information that potentially diminishes attributions of
responsibility to the offender are present. In the absence of such information, a disciplinary
agent apparently attributes responsibility for the unethical act solely to the offender, making a
heuristic such as perceived organizational forgiveness less salient and critical with respect to her
intention to punish.
The finding that seems to be more robust is the positive relationship between perceived
organizational forgiveness and punitive intent when the transgression experience salient to the
disciplinary agent was one of being unforgiven, as opposed to being forgiven. Disciplinary
agents for whom an experience of being unforgiven was salient seemed to be more punitive the
more they saw their organizational context as forgiving, and less punitive the more they saw their
organizational context as unforgiving. Apparently, it is when an experience of not being
forgiven in a forgiving organizational context is salient to disciplinary agents that they increase
their desire to punish and propose more severe sanctions in response to ethical misconduct. This
is a counterintuitive relationship that deserves closer study.
The post-hoc analyses discount the roles that guilt and anger play as potential
mechanisms underlying what I proposed as the interaction effect of perceived organizational
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forgiveness and salient transgression experience on punitive intent. Instead, these post-hoc
analyses suggest that the combination of the experience of being denied forgiveness and the
perception of a forgiving organizational context heightens a disciplinary agent’s ethical
intolerance (i.e., increases her perception that an ethical misconduct is serious). In turn, this high
level of ethical intolerance prompts the agent to be more punitive in response to ethical
misconduct, both in terms of the agent’s intention to punish and proposed sanction.
One possible explanation for this is that individuals who remember being unforgiven in a
forgiving organization experience a form of contextual dissonance, a discrepancy between an
individual’s social characteristics or experience and those of the people who surround her or him
(cf. Rosenberg 1962, 1977). A disciplinary agent with this dissonant experience (i.e., being
unforgiven in a forgiving organizational context) may tend to make that agent more sensitive to
distinctions between what is “good” and what is “bad.” Faced with the task of making a
judgment about ethical misconduct, such individuals apparently tend to compensate for the past
damage for which they were unforgiven, by hewing to behavior that is normative and “moral.”
In doing so, the individual seems to develop an intolerance for unethical behavior, which
translates into higher levels of intention to punish and more severe proposed sanctions in
response to ethical misconduct.
In summary, data from this field study suggested a more nuanced relationship between
perceived organizational forgiveness and punitive intent. In the final chapter, I discuss how one
might reconcile the seemingly contradictory findings from this study with those from the lab
study. I also note the limitations and implications of these studies.
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CHAPTER FOUR: OVERALL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The overarching purpose of this dissertation was to extend research into punishment by
examining the influence of contextual factors in shaping punishment decisions. Specifically, I
investigated the relationship between a disciplinary agent’s perceived organizational forgiveness
and punitive intent in response to ethical misconduct. Evidence from the two empirical studies I
reported suggests that the extent to which a disciplinary agent sees her organization as forgiving
accounts for that person’s decision to punish unethical behavior. Data from the lab study suggest
that the sanctions proposed by decision-makers who perceived the organizational context as
forgiving were less severe than those proposed by disciplinary agents who saw the organizational
context as unforgiving. In addition, evidence from the experiment suggests that the effect of
perceived organizational forgiveness on punitive intent is attenuated when the agent is less
accountable to other organizational members and when the ethical misconduct results in less
severe negative consequences to the organization.
On the other hand, evidence from the field study suggests that the hypothesized negative
relationship between perceived organizational forgiveness and punitive intent holds only under
certain conditions. More precisely, disciplinary agents who perceive their organization as
forgiving tend to indicate lower levels of intention to punish than those who see their
organization as less forgiving, when two conditions hold: (a) when an experience of being
forgiven is salient to them, and (b) when there are mitigating or extenuating circumstances
surrounding the ethical misconduct. Surprisingly, the evidence suggests that under other
conditions, the relationship between perceived organizational forgiveness and punitive intent
appears to be positive. Specifically, disciplinary agents who perceive their organization as
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forgiving tend to indicate higher levels of intention to punish and propose more severe sanctions
than those who see their organization as less forgiving, when an experience of being unforgiven
is salient to them.
One way to reconcile these two seemingly inconsistent sets of findings is to take into
account the distributional nonequivalence2 of perceived organizational forgiveness across the
two studies (cf. Cooper & Richardson, 1986). In the lab study, the negative relationship between
perceived organizational forgiveness and punitive intent was observed over two “extreme” levels
of perceived organizational forgiveness: high (“forgiving”) and low (“unforgiving”). In the field
study, the non-negative relationship between perceived organizational forgiveness and punitive
intent was observed, for the most part, over a narrower range of levels, mostly in the upper half
of the perceived organizational forgiveness scale (i.e., M = 5.21, SD = 1.23). This is not to say
that perceived organizational forgiveness, as an independent variable, suffered from range
restriction in Study 2, as responses among participants ranged from 1 to 7 on the seven-point
response format. However, across the two studies, there is a potential distributional
nonequivalence, in the Cooper and Richardson (1986) sense, because values of perceived
organizational forgiveness in Study 2 did not vary over the whole range of possible levels as did
values in Study 1.
Thus, it is possible that the relationship between perceived organizational forgiveness and
punitive intent observed in Study 1 is not inconsistent with that observed in Study 2. For
instance, the relationship between the two variables may be a nonlinear function that is not
strictly monotonic. In this case, the average level of punitive intent could still be lower among
agents who see their organization as forgiving than among those who see their organization as

2

By distributional nonequivalence between two variables, Cooper and Richardson (1986) meant that the realized
values of one factor or variable do not vary over an equivalent range of realized values of the other variable.
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unforgiving. But among those who see the organization as forgiving (i.e., those whose mean
perceived organizational forgiveness scores lie in the upper half of a scale using an n-point
response format), the relationship between perceived organizational forgiveness and punitive
intent may be positive, negative, or essentially zero, depending on the types of information
salient to the disciplinary agent (e.g., the agent’s transgression experience, the mitigating
circumstances surrounding the unethical act). The potential nuances of the form of the
relationship between perceived organizational forgiveness and punitive intent is an empirical
issue that future research can explore.
Before pointing out the implications of this dissertation for research and practice, it is
important to consider some of its limitations and the directions for future research that these
limitations suggest.
Limitations
One limitation of this dissertation is the cross-sectional design of the studies. This is less
of an issue for Study 1, because the predictor variables were manipulated and participants were
randomly assigned to experimental conditions. However, the design can raise concerns about
causal inferences in Study 2, in which perceived organizational forgiveness and punitive intent
were measured at a single point in time. In addition, the cross-sectional design of these studies
assumes that perceptions of organizational forgiveness are relatively stable over time.
Controlling for the effect of the demographic and psychological covariates whose bivariate
correlations with the punitive intent measures were statistically significant (i.e., age, sex, and
social desirability) reduces this threat to internal validity. Future research using longitudinal
designs may address issues surrounding causal inference and the stability of perceptions.
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A second limitation is the way in which I defined and operationalized forgiveness.
Among scholars of forgiveness within the behavioral sciences, there has been an on-going debate
about the nature and definition of forgiveness. Some insist on a strictly intrapersonal definition
of forgiveness, with the process of overcoming negative cognitions, feelings, and attitudes
towards a transgressor at its core (e.g., Aquino et al., 2003; Worthington, 2006). Others
acknowledge this intrapersonal component, but also emphasize an equally necessary
interpersonal dimension that includes a transgression victim’s willingness to resume pretransgression patterns of interaction with the offender, manifested in actual behaviors (e.g.,
Baumeister, et al. 1998; Rusbult et al., 2005). Although Cameron and Caza (2002) emphasized
the intrapersonal aspects of forgiveness in workplace settings, Cameron et al. (2004) defined and
operationalized forgiveness at the organizational level on the basis of interpersonal aspects of
forgiveness (e.g., being compassionate, forgiving mistakes quickly).
An assumption I made in defining perceived organizational forgiveness as an individual’s
perception and belief that the organization and the organizational members are quick to forgive
mistakes and missteps by other organizational members is that forgiveness subsumes both
dimensions. This was evident in my operationalization of perceived organizational forgiveness
in Study 1, in which I explicitly described the forgiving organization as one in which people
avoid dwelling on failures and past mistakes and tend to overcome resentment or ill-feelings.
This may not have been as evident or explicit in Study 2, in which the measure of perceived
organizational forgiveness I used (i.e., the measure developed by Cameron et al., 2004) taps
mainly into the “forgiving mistakes” aspect of forgiveness. Given that laypeople typically
associate forgiveness (or the word “forgive”) with both intrapersonal and interpersonal
dimensions (Lawler-Row, Scott, Raines, Edlis-Matityahou, & Moore, 2007; Younger, Piferi,
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Jobe, & Lawler, 2004), assuming that the study participants also see forgiveness as subsuming
both dimensions is a reasonable one to make. Nevertheless, future empirical research could tease
out the effects of each of these dimensions of forgiveness on punishment decisions.
Third, punitive intent was measured in response to a particular incidence of employee
theft. There are other forms of ethical misconduct in the workplace that may be perceived either
as more serious or less outrageous than the Steve Atkins incident. In this sense, the
generalizability of the patterns of punitive intent observed may be limited. That said, the
vignette used in the studies seemed to be substantively appropriate and realistic, based on pilottesting. It also appeared to be methodologically appropriate in terms of reducing the likelihood
of ceiling and floor effects.
Given these limitations, the results of these empirical studies still have important
implications for the study not only of punishment, but also of forgiveness. In addition, these
findings have potential implications for the practice of management.
Implications for Research
This dissertation extends research on punishment decision-making in several ways. First,
it highlights the role played by contextual factors in shaping punishment decisions. Although
extant research in social psychology (e.g., Darley et al., 2000; Carlsmith, 2006) has demonstrated
the influence of contextual factors on punishment decision-making, these factors have, for the
most part, been circumstances surrounding the object of the punishment – the perpetrator or the
transgression. In demonstrating that a disciplinary agent’s perceived organizational forgiveness
influences her punishment decisions, this dissertation incorporates the decision-maker’s context
as an antecedent to punishment decisions. It thereby calls attention to the role of factors that are
likely to be independent of the nature of the offender or the offense being punished.
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Theoretically, incorporating elements of the decision-maker’s context into models of punishment
decision-making facilitates the development of more comprehensive models explaining
intentions to punish. Given that variation in punishment decisions is not entirely explained by
elements of the transgression or characteristics of the transgressor, examining perceived
organizational forgiveness (and other similar organizational context factors) as antecedent to
punishment decisions raises interesting questions and opens opportunities to examine more
subtle influences that shape punitive judgment. Much of the debate within social psychology
regarding the motives individuals have for punishing assumes that punishment justifications
(e.g., retribution, incapacitation, moral outrage) and attributions are associated with unique
aspects of transgressions (see Carlsmith, 2006). Examining perceived organizational forgiveness
and other similar factors regarding the disciplinary agent’s context relaxes such assumptions, as
well as assumptions about the rationality of the agent and the sources of her moral outrage. To
the extent that a disciplinary agent’s perceptions regarding the unethicality of a morally
questionable act are indicative of her moral outrage and ethical tolerance, the post-hoc analyses
presented in the second study suggest that a combination of contextual factors that are
forgiveness-related have the potential to make individuals more ethically sensitive. In other
words, these findings suggest that the moral outrage that drives punishment intentions may be
influenced by contextual factors independent of the offense that is the target of punishment.
Second, this dissertation proposed and demonstrated that punishment, at least from a
disciplinary agent’s perspective, is related to forgiveness. Although philosophers, theologians,
and lay persons have long associated forgiveness with punishment and have grappled with the
nuances surrounding the relationship between these two concepts, social scientists have, for the
most part, examined punishment independently of forgiveness. The only exceptions within the

88

behavioral sciences are recent work by Aquino, Bies, and Tripp (e.g., Aquino, Bies, & Tripp,
2006; Tripp, Bies, & Aquino, 2007), which has examined punitive revenge and forgiveness as
alternative responses to interpersonal transgressions. Considering forgiveness as a contextual
variable (cf. Cameron et al., 2004), I extend the literature on punishment by integrating the role
that forgiveness plays as an antecedent to punishment decisions.
One by-product of examining forgiveness as an antecedent to punitive intent is that this
dissertation also extends research on the interpersonal consequences of forgiveness. Whereas
there has been a rich literature on the intrapersonal consequences of forgiveness (e.g., the health
benefits of forgiving to the forgiving individual), there has been very limited study regarding the
consequences of forgiveness on individuals who have been forgiven or unforgiven (for recent
exceptions, see Kelln and Ellard, 1999 and Wallace et al., 2008). In particular, the results of this
dissertation draw attention to potential unintended consequences of forgiveness on individuals
who are not the victims of transgression. Scholars of the positive psychology and positive
organizational behavior traditions have viewed forgiveness as good and unforgiveness as less
than desirable. To the extent that moralistic punishment (i.e., punishing ethical misconduct) is
“good” and “ethical,” the results of these dissertation studies suggest that an unforgiving context
may also promote judgment that is “good” and “ethical” among disciplinary agents.
In Study 1, the mean intention to punish and mean proposed sanction were highest among
participants assigned to the condition where the organizational context was unforgiving and the
negative consequences of the ethical misconduct to the organization were severe. That the
confidence interval of the mean intention to punish and confidence interval of proposed sanction
did not overlap (for the most part) with the other confidence intervals of the mean in this
unforgiving-high negative consequences condition suggests that these higher levels of punitive
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intent were less likely to be the result of unsystematic variability in the dependent measures. In
addition, this suggests that higher punishment intentions were driven by an unforgiving context,
in combination with a serious offense.
In Study 2, the mean intention to punish and mean proposed sanction were apparently
highest among participants assigned to the contextually dissonant condition of having been
denied forgiveness in a forgiving organization. Given the pattern of results in Study 1, these
results raise the possibility that an unforgiving context, whether in terms of a psychological
climate or a salient personal experience, may interact with other contextual factors to induce
disciplinary agents to engage in higher levels of moralistic punishment.
Lastly, the results of this dissertation suggest that scholars studying punishment should
take a second look at criterion variables used in punishment research. Although the two
measures of punitive intent, intention to punish and proposed sanctions, were significantly
correlated in both studies, they differed in terms of the extent to which they were influenced by
perceived organizational forgiveness and the moderators used. In previous experimental studies
on punishment in social psychology, similar “dual operationalizations” of punishment have been
used. For instance, in the research of Darley and colleagues (e.g., Carlsmith et al., 2002; Darley
et al., 2000), “appropriate punishment severity,” analogous to the intention to punish measure
used in this dissertation, usually appears as a two-item measure with a seven-point response
format. A “sentencing scale,” analogous to the proposed sanction measure used in this
dissertation, usually appears in a 13-point response format ranging from not guilty to life
sentence. Similar to the results of this dissertation, those previous studies have reported high
correlations between these analogous dependent measures (i.e., as high as .91). However,
contrary to the pattern of results I found, those studies reported negligible differences in the
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patterns of results across the two measures. Apart from psychometric differences between the
measures used in this dissertation and the measures used in previous studies, one factor that may
explain the differences in patterns of results between intention to punish and proposed sanction is
the context in which experimental studies on punishment have been carried out. For instance,
business students with work experience who are tasked to punish an unethical employee (as is
the case in these dissertation studies) may draw a sharper distinction between their desire to
punish and the actual sanction they propose than undergraduate students who are tasked to
punish an individual guilty of violating criminal statutes (as is the case in the other social
psychology studies). Whether the “psychological proximity” between the participants and the
transgressors, or some other factor, is driving the difference in the pattern of results found in this
dissertation is a question for future research on punishment decision-making.
Aside from these research implications, the findings from this dissertation also have
potential implications for practice.
Implications for Practice
The results of these studies suggest that at least under certain conditions, perceptions of
organizational forgiveness have the potential of shaping punishment decisions in the workplace.
Recognizing this, human resource managers may want to take such perceptions into account
when reviewing formal disciplinary actions recommended or imposed by self-managed teams
and by first-level supervisors in response to ethical misconduct. This may prove useful in
attenuating high levels of disciplinary sanctions that might have come about as the result of
considerations only remotely related to the ethical misconduct. Doing so would likely go a long
way in discouraging punished employees from feeling unfairly treated or excessively punished.
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Conversely, given the benefits of having a forgiving organization in terms of encouraging
innovation (Cameron et al., 2004), managers may want to be cautious in promoting perceptions
of organizational forgiveness. Engaging in ways to enhance perceived organizational forgiveness
may result in the application of weak sanctions in response to ethical misconduct. To the extent
that imposing weak sanctions for ethical violations is perceived as tolerance for unethical
behavior, having a high level of perceived organizational forgiveness among employees may
serve to counteract ethical initiatives of the organization, by making people unwilling to punish
appropriately and to administer negative sanctions against unethical conduct. Worse, high levels
of perceived organizational forgiveness may promote a false impression that ethically
questionable acts will not necessarily be punished, and are therefore acceptable.
Summary
There are many potential factors that influence the punishment decisions made by
individuals in response to ethical misconduct in the workplace. In this dissertation, I proposed
that a disciplinary agent’s perceived organizational forgiveness and the agent’s punitive intent
would be negatively related, such that agents who see their organization as forgiving will tend to
punish less severely than agents who see their organization as unforgiving. Evidence from the
two studies I conducted yielded equivocal results. Data from the lab study were consistent with
this main hypothesis and suggest that this relationship holds when the disciplinary agent is high
in accountability and is punishing in response to misconduct that has resulted in serious damage
to the organization. Data from the field study did not support this main hypothesis. Instead, this
negative relationship seemed to hold only when an experience of being forgiven was salient in
the mind of the disciplinary agent and there were mitigating circumstances surrounding the
ethical misconduct that is the subject of punishment. Surprisingly, the field study results suggest
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a positive relationship between perceived organizational forgiveness and punitive intent when an
experience of being denied forgiveness is salient to the disciplinary agent. In this final chapter, I
proposed a possible explanation for reconciling these seemingly inconsistent findings. I also
pointed out limitations of these studies and the future directions for research that these
limitations suggest. Finally, I suggested that the results of this dissertation might have several
important implications to research on punishment and forgiveness and to the practice of
management.
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Jake’s
10847 W Sand Lake St., Orlando, FL 32819

MEMORANDUM

TO:

Chris Meyer, Assistant Manager

FROM: James Walters, Controller
RE:

Steve Atkins Incident

DATE: October 16, 2007
CC:

Mary Copeland, Manager

As per your request, here is what I found out about Steve Atkins, our assistant in charge of ordering and
receiving restaurant equipment and supplies, based on reliable information I have gathered from other employees.
In the delivery for the week ending July 6, 2007, Steve discovered an espresso maker that, by some mistake, was not
ordered and did not appear on the invoice. Steve took the espresso maker home. Our supplier, Jensen Marketing,
did not know about Steve’s actions until early last week. Unfortunately, based on my conversation with Jensen’s
representative, Steve’s actions seemed to have made them seriously doubt our credibility as a business customer,
which may likely result in more stringent and costly delivery processes for us.
At the minimum, we have to ask Steve to return what he took. Of course, you know what people say
around here: everyone deserves a second chance. There are additional sanctions you may want to consider, such as
suspension without pay or even termination.
Let me know if you need more information to make your decision.
Chris – I’m sure other managers and assistant managers will be interested to see how you deal with this
case and how you will justify your decision. To make things easier for you, I attached on the next page a
series of questions that you may respond to.
Thanks,
Barbara

PLEASE GO ON TO THE NEXT PAGE.
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Jake’s
10847 W Sand Lake St., Orlando, FL 32819

MEMORANDUM
TO:

Chris Meyer, Asst. Manager

FROM: Barbara Brown, Senior Admin. Asst.
RE:

Steve Atkins Incident
Chris – Indicate the extent to which you agree with each of the following statements. Please circle one
number, according to the following scale.

1
Strongly disagree

2

3

4

5

6

7
Strongly agree

1.

What Steve did was a major breach of ethical standards.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

2.

I intend to punish Steve severely.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

3.

Steve’s actions constitute grave misconduct.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

4.

I plan to impose a stiff penalty on Steve for his actions.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

5.

What Steve did constitutes a serious offense.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

6.

I am inclined to enforce serious negative sanctions on Steve.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

In addition to asking Steve to return what he took, should we impose an additional sanction on him?
Please circle your recommended disciplinary action:
No
suspension

1-2 day
suspension
without
pay

3-4 day
suspension
without
pay

1-week
suspension
without
pay

2-week
suspension
without
pay

3-week
suspension
without
pay

1-month
suspension
without
pay

2-month
suspension
without
pay

Termination

In addition to your response above, do you have any comments?
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
Thanks,
Barbara
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Instructions
Now that you have finished the "in-basket," we want to know your perceptions about Jake’s.
In completing this part, it is very important that you do not turn back to any of the preceding
parts. Please respond to the items below based upon the impressions you formed while playing
the role of Chris Meyer, Assistant Manager.
To what extent does each of the following statements characterize Jake’s ? Please use the
following scale to record your responses. Write the most appropriate number in the blank to the
left of each statement. If at all possible, please do not skip any of the items.
1
Strongly
Disagree

2
Disagree

3
Slightly
Disagree

4
Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

5
Slightly
Agree

Jake’s is a company where people…
______ 1.

are professional.

______ 2.

are forgiving.

______ 3.

are generous.

______ 4.

achieve desired results.

______ 5.

dwell on past mistakes or bad decisions.

______ 6.

believe in customer service.

______ 7.

can be counted on to achieve results.

______ 8.

tend to harbor grudges.
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6
Agree

7
Strongly
Agree
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